

JULY 1960

CURRENT

THE SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL

FROM ALL SOURCES

ON THE FRONTIER PROBLEMS OF TODAY

75 CENTS

TO THE READER

In the body of the magazine, all material to the right of the vertical rule is either direct quotation from or objective summary of the words of the author named in the margin.

The source is stated at the end of each item. For readers who would like to obtain full texts or subscribe to publications quoted, all sources are recapitulated in an alphabetical list which includes addresses, frequency of publication, single copy and subscription costs. This list begins on page 2.

Through its Readers Service, Current makes available free to subscribers each month a selection of brochures and reprints, some of which are cited in the text. The list appears on the back cover. The flap on the back cover is a postpaid card for ordering Readers Service items.

CURRENT'S SOURCES

Current's sources of material are unrestricted. They include general and special periodicals; academic journals and proceedings of learned societies; books, pamphlets and reports from commercial publishers, universities, foundations and funds, citizen organizations and special interest groups; daily and Sunday newspapers, especially editorials, columns and features; television and radio commentators, interviews, forums; government and intergovernment sources; statements of opinion leaders.

CURRENT'S AFFAIRS

Last month, under the frontier problem, "The Uses of Art," we published three views on the boom in painting. They came from Harold Rosenberg, an art critic, James Johnson Sweeney, a museum director, and Saul Steinberg, a student of life. Mr. Steinberg's contribution was in the form of a drawing because he expresses himself most effectively in this way.

We think our readers understood what we were doing perfectly well. But a few have asked us how, in view of our rigorous editorial formula, we could justify the publication of "illustrations." Mr. Steinberg's drawing is not, of course, an illustration. And Mr. Steinberg is not an illustrator. His drawing has the same status as printed text.

We do not intend to use cartoons or illustrations or decorations for their own sake or "to break up the type." We are satisfied that the layout of *Current* is a useful, vivid and respectful use of a great medium: type on paper. It requires no embellishment. We do not expect to change this layout basically but we will experiment with improvements.

We do plan, however, to use drawings—and also photographs—that present insights which words in type cannot. Our rule will be that the photo or drawing should be a valid comment in itself, able to stand without explanation or caption.

We invite our readers to help us find this material. We will consider unpublished as well as published visual material. We will not be bound by reputations or professionalism, but our standards of selection will be high and probably beyond reach of the average amateur.

What we hope to find in this visual material, as suggested by Daniel Newman, our consulting editor for this area, are "images of the changed face of man and the place of man in our society, of the shifting face of our landscape, of the new landscape of science."

The themes that will be relevant for visual material will be sometimes broader, sometimes sharper than the frontier problems of our text imply. They may sometimes relate directly to a specific problem that our text is dealing with, but we will not set any limitations. Within our general purpose, we will let the themes for visual material evolve by themselves.

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

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THE OVERSEAS AMERICANS

What new problems do Americans find when they go abroad today to represent their country's interests? What kinds of persons have been going? What kind should be going? Answers to these questions are provided in studies by five scholars financed by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

THE MYTH OF NONINTERFERENCE

Dean Cleveland of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University is a former assistant director of the Mutual Security Agency. Professor Mangone is director of the Maxwell Overseas Training Program. Dr. Adams is professor of political science at the Maxwell School.

**Harlan Cleveland,
Gerard J. Mangone,
and
John Clarke Adams**

"Just as the United States began to take its international position seriously enough to add to its traditional consular service a body of career diplomats, the whole foundation of arm's-length capital-city aristocrat-level diplomacy began to crumble away. Rapid communications between capitals made it increasingly possible to bypass or supersede ambassadors. The function of representation vis-à-vis the Foreign Office became more and more ceremonial as the practice developed of having ministers and experts meet and negotiate directly. . . .

"The rise of democracy and the breakdown of the power monopolies formerly in the hands of aristocracies of birth or wealth gradually robbed the teas and court balls of much of their pertinence. . . . Representing America to whole societies, rather than just to an elite, placed a premium on different qualities. Political reporting began to require the widest imaginable range of contacts with all elements of real power in each society; after all, in a time of rapid political change it might be more relevant to get along with the next government than with the current one.

"The expanded range of political reporting accounts, moreover, for less than half of the news reporting that our representatives are called on to submit. . . . Government agencies in Washington need expert economic reporting as well. The political section of an embassy with its first, second, and third secretaries, which used . . . to perform almost all of the embassy's functions, is now overshadowed and overpowered by the economic counselors, the treasury representatives, and the attachés (agricultural, labor, commercial, mining, press, and scientific). . . .

"Before World War II virtually all overseas United States civilian personnel worked for the State Department; today even the recently enlarged Foreign Service accounts for only about one in five of the 32,805 government people working abroad. . . .

"Since its establishment in 1947 . . . the Central Intelligence Agency has been absorbing a constantly growing proportion of the foreign reporting and operating tasks of government—and tucking them behind a security curtain that obscures both successes and failures from foreign eyes and from serious Congressional review. . . .

"Like other foreign operations, the Government's clandestine intelligence operations represent an unannounced revision of the principal of 'non-

**Intelligence
operations**

**Reciprocal
opinion-making**

interference.' . . . One reason why a growing proportion of our foreign relations is being carried on in clandestine channels, perhaps, is that we need to hide what we are doing not only from others but also (in view of verbal adherence to 'noninterference') from ourselves. . . .

"The current involvement of whole societies in each other's daily lives is far beyond the control of government, if not beyond its concern. American-produced movies occupy more than 50 per cent of the *total* screen time in *each* of the world's major regions. American fast communication media pour forth each day between one and two million words for foreign consumption; the United States produces about 10 per cent of the world's books each year. According to a recent compilation by the State Department, every year some 4,421,000 American tourists travel abroad. . . .

"Considering its limitations—\$100 million a year and only 1,168 overseas American employees—the problem for the U.S. Information Service is to make itself heard at all in the midst of this hubbub of international interaction. . . .

"But the chief limitation of any United States propaganda operation is that it represents a wildly pluralistic society in which it is not anybody's official business to say authoritatively what America's purposes are and how they will be pursued. An accurate reflection of such a society is a multiple image. An undistorted echo of its politics is not a Voice [of America] but a babel of voices raised in democratic argument. It is hard for the government to 'sell America,' because the American people have not delegated to their government the authority to put it up for sale. Increasingly, therefore, the function of USIS in every country is to seek out all elements of the population and try to make sure they understand the nature of American society and have a sound basis for an understanding of American foreign policy from day to day. Other countries do the same work in the United States: the nations' intervention in each other's opinion-making processes is energetically reciprocal.

**Operators
rather than
advisers**

"The more 'underdeveloped' the country, the more inappropriate is mere cool advice, the more necessary an active role by the advisers in actual operations. As more countries emerge from colonial rule, especially in Africa, the need for operators rather than advisers becomes more acute. . . . In Ghana, first of the new African [states], there were, at the time of independence in 1957, just 80 architects of whom only 4 were Africans; only 20 to 30 per cent of all the engineers in Ghana were African; and hardly any of the young Ghanaians studying in Europe or America were taking any kind of technical course. In these circumstances the first job of a 'technical adviser' often is to get something started; the next job to train nationals to perform subordinate tasks; the third stage is to select and train an 'opposite number' who can gradually take over operating responsibility; then — and only then — can the American retire to a truly advisory role. . . .

"The United States already has its fingers in the political pastry of many countries, whether the American people like it or not . . . [but] these fingers are partly paralyzed by official reluctance to admit that the United States is interested in 'domestic' political developments beyond our own shores.

"The military-aid program is an example: The generals and colonels in charge of most military-assistance advisory groups abroad . . . usually believe their function to be limited to the training of troops in the use of modern weapons and advising on military organization and tactics. Yet in a dozen countries or more the foreign military officers we have trained are almost bound to have a powerful . . . voice in determining the political

**Ambassadors
as executives**

composition of their own civilian government, its foreign-policy posture, and the direction of its economic-development programs.

"Similarly, United States technical and economic aid has very important impacts on the domestic politics of several dozen nations. In this progress-conscious era, a Minister of Health may ride to the premiership not on a white horse but on a malaria-eradication program or a network of carefully placed rural health clinics. Yet if you ask civilian technicians or economic aid officials to describe the central purpose of their mission, they will most often formulate it either in vague clichés about soliciting friendship or in the narrow language of the official's specialty. . . . Members of ICA missions typically pin their faith on 'economic development' or 'economic growth' or 'improvement in living standards' or 'getting people better educated' or 'getting our aid out to the village level.' Too seldom do they make the connection between these intermediate goals and the development of political institutions strong enough to survive in a turbulent world and free enough to be compatible with our own institutions in a peaceful world order. . . .

"Above all, the new facts of diplomatic life have raised serious questions about a system which projects men whose main experience has been in reporting and negotiation into most of the nation's ambassadorships, just when the ambassador's task has come to be that of a large-scale public executive. In the era of foreign operations that is now upon us, the ambassador's constitutional position as the President's man abroad is now being reinterpreted to include the task of presiding over the whole range of United States governmental activities in the country to which he is assigned.

"The effective ambassador, therefore, needs not only diplomatic but also executive qualities of the first order. If the trend of filling all but the 'rich men's posts' (like Paris and London) from the career service continues, the career service will have to make sure that its members have been given ample opportunity to acquire executive experience by working in the foreign-operations agencies."

SNUGLERS AND ETHNOCENTRICS

**The urge
to "pass"**

"In the mirror of Asians' remarks about the recent American invasion of Asia, the sharpest comments are reserved for the 'snugglers'—those Americans who feel that the way to overcome culture shock is to forget America and melt into a new, adopted nationality and culture. Many G.I.'s settled down in Japan after World War II and the Korean War—forming, too hastily, friendships that were often too intense to be lasting. In India there are Americans who profess an exaggerated admiration for everything Indian; their wives wear saris, their homes take on a native air, they lose no occasion to compare American culture unfavorably with the Indian. Sometimes the intoxication is the result of suddenly relaxed moral standards; sometimes it can be traced to the corrupting influence of sudden (relative) wealth, and the illusion that it can buy respect and love.

"The snugglers want, quite simply, to belong. They are prepared to pay what they think is the price of belonging—the rejection of their own background as Americans. When they find that they cannot 'pass' as Japanese, Indians or Arabs, when they realize they will always be outside looking in, the snugglers may neurotically turn their wrath and resentment on the foreigners who won't permit an American to escape his Americanness.

"In popular literature about Americans abroad, the snugglers not infrequently turn up as heroes who, like those featured in *The Ugly American*,

Sentiment vs.
analysis

love everybody except their own American colleagues. Their capacity for love, moreover, bears a direct correlation to their nearness to the 'village level,' a phrase which is ordinarily not so much a geographic term as a euphoric state of mind and heart. Among these heroes, sentimentality is equated to goodwill, goodwill to 'success' against the all-too-clever Communists. Their motto might be taken from the advice given us by Ghana's Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah: 'In Africa,' he said, 'love everybody you see.' Their willingness to substitute sentiment for analysis makes them first cousins to the beachcomber with his string of mistresses. . . .

"The smugglers thus enshrined in popular literature do, of course, exist in the real world too. A good many missionaries and a few technical-assistance people do in fact live at the 'village level' physically or emotionally. But if they really go native they find their effectiveness is blunted; they have been sent, after all, not to embrace the whole of the local culture but to effect fundamental changes in that culture—in the direction of Christ, or modern medical practice, or steel plowshares, or some other aspect of 'modernization.'

"At the opposite extreme from the smugglers are those Americans who in their single-minded ethnocentrism never do learn even the rudiments of adjustment. They do not even try, for they are preoccupied with a different problem: how to adjust the ways of others to the American norm. To judge by the comments of America's foreign friends in many lands, the cheerful assumption that 'American' is a synonym for 'best' is even harder for them to take than snuggling is. The gist of many comments . . . comes down to something like this: 'We resent your taking for granted that the highest aspiration for any people is their quite natural desire to be American, or at least to be like Americans.'" (*The Overseas Americans*)

Dr. Adams is professor of economics at Michigan State University; Dr. Garraty is professor of history at Columbia University.

Walter Adams
and
John A. Garraty

"Ask almost any American how the job ought to be done, and he will suggest that we start at the 'grass roots.' In American folklore, 'that's the democratic thing to do.' To be effective, it is said, a missionary must get away from the cities into the country—away from the 'brass hats' and out with 'the troops.' Lederer and Burdick [authors of *The Ugly American*], for example, idealize the Americans roaming 'the barrios and the boon-docks.' Their heroes, Colonel Hillandale and Father Finian, 'go off into the countryside and show the idea of America to the people.' Superficially, this idea is appealing. Our overseas programs are overcrowded with protocol-happy, class-oriented, bureaucratic officials who are blissfully ignorant of what is happening beyond the confines of the American quarter. It is true that these people should get away more often than they do from their Little Americas. Nevertheless, to suggest that American programs should be pitched predominantly to the hinterlands would be unwise. The reason is self-evident. We do not have enough Colonel Hillandales to blanket the world. There are not nearly enough Ugly Americans (or Russians) to bring engineering know-how to the people of every village in Asia. Desirable as it is in theory to work at the grass roots, we must remember our limited resources. We must 'stretch' these resources and aim for the 'multiplier' effect. Our only hope for lasting influence is to teach teachers and establish native training institutions which will carry on after we are gone. This is the only realistic way of ensuring a return on our investment. America's resources cannot be tied up in any one project or any one country indefinitely." (*Is the World Our Campus?*)

**Harlan Cleveland,
Gerard J. Mangone,
and
John Clarke Adams**

**Black skin
or white?**

**Businessmen vs.
government employees**

"The one group that seems least able to forget about race differences is the small minority of American Negroes who now work abroad, most of them with U.S. Government agencies. No figures are available on the number of Negroes now in overseas service, but it is clear that the number is growing. Negroes are especially encouraged to go into some programs, as information officers and ICA technicians, in part because of a widespread, if vaguely expressed, assumption that a colored person has an advantage over other Americans in dealing with the nonwhite peoples of Asia and Africa.

"Many Negroes in Asia and Africa will assert, if asked, that it is indeed helpful in their work not to have white skin. Some American Negroes in Indonesia whom we interviewed on this point all regarded it as an advantage. One of them was so light-skinned that he had to keep telling the Indonesians he was really a Negro. 'But my wife helps,' he added. 'She's quite brown-skinned.' . . .

"There are, however, two sides to the question of sending American Negroes into foreign service. . . . A special investigation of opinion on this point in Indonesia produced several arguments against assigning Negroes there. The Indonesians themselves, according to some white Americans, are prejudiced against darker peoples, and most American Negroes are darker than they. ('The Ethiopian compares himself to the Southern gentleman, not to the colored slaves,' said an Armenian in Addis Ababa.) Many Indonesians believe, not without cause, that the Negro often is a second-class citizen in the United States. They therefore feel insulted when Negroes are sent out as representatives of America to Indonesia, implying that the Indonesians themselves are second-class people. They harbor doubts that such 'second-class citizens' could be as well qualified as the comparable white American would be, for their image of the Negro is the Southern sharecropper, not the graduate student in New York or Chicago. Some Indonesians feel that Negroes are sent out to Asia merely to prove something which the Indonesians believe to be untrue: namely, that Americans treat Negroes well.

"A reverse discrimination results from the morbid interest of colored peoples everywhere in the treatment of the Negro in America. . . . The pretty wife of a Negro Foreign Service officer in Asia asserted that she had never really wished to be white until she met this reverse discrimination. The Indians, she complained, smother you with such maudlin kindness and pity that you find yourself wishing you could be treated like 'an ordinary American.' If the white Americans are conspicuous in Asia, the American Negroes are far more so. . . .

"Within the typical American overseas community there is one area of partially hidden conflict that augurs ill for the American position in a number of countries. The traditional American view that 'we need less government in business and more business in government' has been extended abroad. The lack of understanding that exists between Americans working for the government and Americans working for private enterprise is seen in the gap between the business community and the government community at many overseas posts. At its worst, the two groups look at each other as if each were in the country solely to thwart the interests of the other. The extreme business view holds that U.S. Government offices abroad are there to hinder business operations, not to help. The extreme government view would be that the average American business is operating to the detriment of the United States, for the object of business is to extract rather than contribute."

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

"The overseas worker should be able to do his job so well that he can find ways of doing it under the difficulties of a foreign environment, such as the lack of trained personnel, modern tools, and so forth. He will normally get a more varied experience than his domestic counterpart, but he must be prepared to stand alone more often than his colleague at home. Too often, however, the men and women sent abroad have not more, but less job competence than would be tolerated in the United States. Because the demand is great and the supply small, second-rate economists, agricultural specialists, religious ministers, or businessmen may be sent into overseas operations. The deficiencies of such persons are quickly recognized in a foreign post. Individual faults cannot be concealed as well as they might be in New York, Washington, or Los Angeles, by the organization.

"In overseas posts, it would be foolish to imagine that technical skill requires the narrowest specialization. On the contrary, the people who often seemed to know their jobs best were those who had a variety of experiences to relate or compare to their special disciplines. The highest technical skill for overseas service is based on a breadth of education and experience that will allow an adaptable general practitioner to play a versatile role.

"What is most wrong with the selection of Americans for overseas service is . . . the simple and extraordinary fact that selection and training are regarded as two different actions. Except for some of the missionary organizations, agencies and business firms first select an individual for a job abroad, then (time and funds permitting) give him some training for his new work.

"Training for overseas service is thus generally regarded as specific preparation for the overseas job, rather than as part of the recruitment process too—the aspect in which attitudes are tested and observed while skills are taught. . . . By close observation and continuous testing for the elements that would predict high-level overseas performance, the instructors in even a short training institute should at least be able to screen out the weakest prospects. But this can be done only if the decision to hire is made *after* the training period.

"The best selection method for overseas Americans . . . is an extended educational experience that stresses how work and life abroad differ from the work and life in the United States. The American educational system, with its opportunity to take people in their formative years and expose them to a long, purposeful program, has a prime responsibility in preparing United States citizens for work abroad. Only the liberal arts colleges, technical schools, and graduate faculties can fashion imaginative programs that will adequately test and develop the potential of students. . . .

"The shortfall in the education, selection, and training of Americans for work abroad has not been exaggerated. As a nation we can ignore only at our peril the international impact of any 'misrepresentation' abroad. . . .

"In the absence of a serious attack on the whole problem of education for overseas service, a frustrated sense of urgency inevitably produces a good deal of enthusiasm for specialized panaceas. One of the narrowest is also the most frequently advocated: a Foreign Service Academy, modeled on West Point or Annapolis. Such an approach would abandon as hopeless the entire United States system of higher education and establish from scratch a school under bureaucratic control to train a few career diplomats for a Foreign Service that is no longer an élite corps of diplomatic specialists but a large body of Americans, encompassing many different specialties,

Selection through
education

**Federal
responsibility**

which will increasingly have to assume the coordinating role in all governmental operations abroad. A proposal less relevant to the size and character of the real overseas-training problem would be hard to imagine. It is to the credit of the Executive Branch and the Congressional leadership that this hardly perennial, the proposal for a Foreign Service Academy, has been given the 'Yes, but' treatment whenever it has showed its head.

"But if it is not going to solve the overseas-training problem with a cure-all, the Federal Government must face up to the broader task of inducing the changes required in American education to serve the nation's interest by providing a pool of young Americans who will be adequately prepared for living and working abroad. That the Government can do this without slipping into Federal control of education has already been amply demonstrated. . . .

"The United States Congress might usefully establish in the Executive Branch a National Foundation for Overseas Operations, with a board of trustees drawn from the Federal agencies concerned and from private business, educational, and philanthropic organizations. The National Foundation would not conduct research and training activities itself, but would exist to pull together activities of government and spur the actions of non-governmental organizations as they relate to the education of Americans for overseas assignments." (*The Overseas Americans*)

A PROPOSAL

Mr. St. Lawrence, chairman of the physical education department in Suffern (N.Y.) High School, and a former Fulbright lecturing professor in Iraq, writes in a letter to Current:

Joseph St. Lawrence

"We are totally neglecting one of the most valuable manpower resources we have for the creation of a better understanding of the challenges America faces abroad. I refer to the 100,000 students, teachers and experts who have lived and studied in foreign countries as participants in the Fulbright and other academic exchanges during the past ten years.

"These cultural diplomats make contacts that our official diplomats can't make and usually acquire a rich and realistic understanding of the problems of the countries they visit. After they return home, they prepare reports that are filed and forgotten. The Government takes no further interest in them. Some of us, on our own, make our experiences available to local civic groups and educational institutions. But this is entirely voluntary and uncoordinated.

"What I propose is that the Fulbright scholars in the United States set up an alumni association. It could be organized by regional and local chapters in the United States and perhaps also on the basis of the countries in which they taught or studied abroad. This association could then undertake to encourage and coordinate the informational and educational activities that its members could perform. They could also be available, at least in an advisory capacity, to legislators and policy-makers.

"More than 100 Fulbright clubs exist abroad made up of foreigners who studied here. Together with their United States counterparts, they would constitute a pool of international cultural minute men available to create better understanding of areas of the world where crises occur.

"The American Fulbright scholars are also veterans of foreign wars—foreign cultural wars. The country needs what they can contribute to our foreign policy." (June 15, 1960)

MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

MOBILIZING TALENT FOR SECURITY

The chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery summarizes the obstacles which keep first-rate people out of government service.

**Senator
Henry M. Jackson**

"1. Much of our recruiting has been on a haphazard basis. . . . Nowhere in government do we have a central office to assist the departments and agencies in finding the right man for the right job. . . .

"2. Many men appointed to high posts in the national security field have little acquaintance with the intricate problems they are called on to resolve. . . .

"3. The government has been plagued with high rates of turnover in key posts. . . . A recent study covering several hundred businessmen who had served in government and left [showed that] 48 per cent served only one year or less—only 33 per cent served over two years. . . .

"4. The so-called conflict of interest laws . . . are out of step with the economic realities of the twentieth century. They also run counter to the government's needs for talent. . . . We cannot expect men to give up stock options, pension plans and other benefits to accept federal posts. These security-oriented arrangements now provide the basis for long-range economic planning for millions of Americans. . . . A large law firm might have to give up its entire tax or antitrust practice just so one partner could serve as a government consultant. For this reason, able lawyers in New York could not accept service as consultants to the State Department, as members of the Fine Arts Commission or the National Advisory Council on Mental Health. . . .

**Exclusion
by pension**

"5. The so-called dual compensation laws constitute another case where ancient statutes hamstring our search for special skills and experience. . . . An able military officer, highly trained at government expense over a period of twenty years, . . . has technical knowledge and ample administrative, diplomatic and general leadership experience. Under our present system, he retires in his late forties or early fifties. There are many posts throughout government where he could continue to make an important contribution. But the dual compensation law says he cannot draw both his pension—which he has already earned—and a government salary where the combined amount exceeds \$10,000. So he will take his skills and experience outside the government. . . .

"6. We have encountered extreme difficulties in recruiting able young men in their late thirties or early forties, yet this is the very group which can bring to Washington the drive and imagination we need. . . . The prospect of trading their pay checks and fringe benefits for the insecurity and inadequate compensation of government service is not a happy one. . . . Therefore, as [one witness] put it: 'We find ourselves time and again looking to older and retired men, whose experience is adequate but whose vigor and imagination are not always up to the demands of a tough federal job.' . . .

"Congress . . . must act to reform or repeal the archaic conflict of interest

and dual compensation laws. It must act, in conjunction with the Executive, to establish an orderly procedure to catalog and utilize our human resources. It must deal in an honest and realistic way with the problem of low salaries. It must serve notice that it will be reluctant to confirm inexperienced appointees who do not indicate a desire to remain in office long enough to give the kind of service the country has a right to expect.

"The Executive Branch . . . must provide the strong and dynamic leadership which will, in itself, help to attract men of talent. . . . Both Congress and the Executive Branch must strive to develop in this country a sense of duty and of obligation to serve . . . which far transcends personal considerations. . . . In time of an all-out, dramatic hot war, we have brought into government service every skill and talent we sought — regardless of existing attitudes and archaic, statutory impediments. In a cold war, the outcome of which can be just as final and conclusive, we must overcome these impediments by whatever action is called for, so we may call on talents which match our needs." ("Mobilizing Talent for National Security," Address at the Second National Training Conference of the National Defense Executive Reserve, May 23, 1960)

SECRECY AND NATIONAL POLICY

Columbia University's Dr. Isidor I. Rabi, winner of the Nobel award in physics in 1944, pleads for a more informed public opinion—and less military secrecy.

Isidor I. Rabi

"Although the Constitution vests control of foreign policy firmly in the hands of the President, in actual fact the President does not operate in a vacuum. He must share his responsibilities with the Senate, and with the House of Representatives. Agencies of the government in addition to the Department of State are directly concerned; the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission are only the most important. Beyond these there are other agencies but almost as important are the press, the daily, weekly, and monthly periodicals, TV and radio. Behind these are the opinion-makers in the universities, the labor unions, in large and small business and, of newer importance, the scientists and experts of every variety.

"Policy comes out as a harmony produced by all these interacting forces. This has been the American tradition and practice. Now what happens when secrecy intervenes? Pathetic and profound ignorance of the facts does not prevent the policy-makers inside and outside of government from carrying on in the field of atomic energy as if all were clear to them. They gather a rumor here, a leak there, and off they go. Ignorant or learned, they take a stand and public opinion is formed.

"Our government can not act strongly without ample support from public opinion. For wise action an informed public opinion is necessary. When secrecy intervenes, an informed public opinion can hardly exist. Too often we have instead a manipulated public opinion formed by leaks, half truths, innuendoes and by outright distortion of actual facts. . . .

"We can now ask ourselves, what have we really gained from our exaggerated secrecy in the way of real security? Actually very little. The Russians are not far behind us in atomic weapons but our allies have been left way behind after expending an enormous treasure in trying to rediscover facts and techniques already known to the Russians as well as to ourselves. The secrets of military technology must be as highly

protected as any trade secrets but only as long as they are real secrets. In most cases this time is measured in years rather than decades.

"Although most policy-makers, amateur or professional, are not deeply interested or capable of judging the technological situation, secrecy results in frustration, doubt and timidity about the exercise of any independent judgment. The result has been that a number of less inhibited men of greater or lesser scientific or technical accomplishment but with a low boiling point have been gaining the public ear on the basis of prestige acquired through a technical accomplishment, quite limited in scope. Their policy statements are given weight on the basis of skills not necessarily relevant to the dread subjects of war and peace which they discuss with easy confidence. Were it not for the mantle of secrecy which surrounds the hard core of the matter, the intelligent public would be quite capable of judging the questions under discussion. The fear of being guilty of a judgment based on a partial knowledge of the facts misleads many judicious people into accepting judgments by others whose knowledge is often even more partial but which extends into the dread domain of the top secret. . . .

"We are now engaged in tripartite negotiations with the Soviets and the United Kingdom on a test suspension coupled with a system of inspection. Clearly, this is a most delicate matter perhaps best left to the wisdom of the President and his most trusted advisers. It is his job and his duty as set forth in the Constitution. Nevertheless, it has not been left to the President, and public debate, which impairs the freedom of action of the President, rages over the land. This would be just the right thing if the debate were well informed. . . . Unfortunately the debate is not well informed and becomes more of a conflict of pressure groups rather than a quest for clarity and wisdom." (Address at the presentation of the Atoms for Peace awards, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1960)

RESEARCH FOR ACTION

The director of a foundation, The Twentieth Century Fund, warns against the danger of supporting useless research.

"Research is becoming increasingly divorced from deeds. The social sciences seem to have taken over from the natural sciences the old idea that any addition to human knowledge is of itself a boon, regardless of its seeming pertinence or relevancy. A new fact is expected to come in handy, like the missing piece of a jigsaw puzzle, when it is most needed. The trouble is, of course, that in the world as it actually exists, with its imperious necessities and its huge accumulation of books and surveys, the isolated fact is apt to remain isolated. Having been given no life or destiny by its first begetter, it is all too unlikely ever to be given life by another. It dies within its own solid covers, too remote or detached to influence the rapidly moving stream of events. Research which disavows any responsibility except that of being objective and nonutilitarian may well qualify as 'pure.' But it is a kind of purity which a society—particularly a society in an age of change—can overvalue.

"The divorce of research from a sense of relevance and pertinency has been encouraged by developments within the social science disciplines. Political science becomes behavioral in its approach; economics becomes concerned with model-building. The desire to know and to understand takes the place of the desire to act; under the banner of relativism and

**Research for
its own sake**

cultural norms almost any practice, no matter how barbarous or irrational—from head-hunting to the taking of bribes—can be justified as part of the social process. If the students in our universities are indeed turning from the social sciences to the arts, the explanation may be that they feel themselves let down and somehow cheated by this denial of moral responsibility among those who teach the once-great disciplines. In the arts they can, at least, achieve a sense of involvement, a feeling that they are men and women with a capacity to create and apply critical standards.

"When research takes on an existence of its own there are subtle degradations which affect the policy-makers no less than the scholars. Then it seems that no move can be made until a research project has been launched and the last fact ascertained. The foundations and universities find themselves fulfilling in society a role which they would be the last to claim—repositories of an ultimate sanction and a kind of final veto. Not able to act themselves, they seem capable by their choice of research projects to limit and define the action of others. Yet in the life of the world there are things that need to be affirmed, and things that need, above all, to be done.

"In rare but significant cases, it is true, reform measures have followed irresistibly upon the disclosure of facts through a scholarly survey; even then there has usually been (if one looked deep enough) a passion and a conviction at play, however carefully disguised by the scholar's method and apparatus. Facts *can* 'speak for themselves'; in practice they rarely do. It is not research that tells us where as a nation we ought to be tending or by what measures, how timed and executed, we ought to be getting there. At best, research casts some little light upon a pathway which faith and insight have already marked out. . . .

" 'Rightly to be great,' we can all repeat with Shakespeare, 'is not to stir without great argument.' Facts are linked with action; policy and research are not part of two different worlds. The idea of 'great argument' as the forerunner and accompaniment of action at the highest level is characteristic, we would like to think, of our society. The challenge is to make sure that such a goal is not lost amid the fragmentation of knowledge, the specialization of disciplines, and the heretical (and actually unscientific) assumption that facts by themselves tell the whole story.

"The leader and policy-maker should not find the concept of 'great argument' hard to define, however hard it may be to fulfill in the heat of battle. Facts marshaled and lucidly presented, sustaining and illuminating convictions born in the responsible exercise of power: this is the course of statesmanship. But what of the scholar or researcher? He cannot use facts to support a predetermined thesis. No doubt; and yet the greatest works of scholarship have had at the heart of them a kind of belief; their objectivity has been achieved through stress and effort, not born of the original sin of indifference.

**Facts for a
candid world**

"There is another sense in which research contributes to the great argument of democracy. Even the survey most restricted to a recital of bare facts can by its timing, by its roots in actual events, link itself to the big choices to be made. A piece of research may fail; it may be late in coming or wide of the mark in its results—but let it not be said, at least, that it was begun without wanting to influence what men do! Research must aim to create the framework of action, to set limits to the debate among practical men. Meanwhile the honest scholar can always keep the hope that the reflection of reality which he creates will be by itself so compelling as to make the subsequent action self-evident." (The Twentieth Century Fund, *Annual Report, 1959*. Available through Readers Service)

HOW DOES THE ECONOMY GROW?

WITH PRIVATE PILLS?

The executive vice-chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth defends private efforts.

W. Allen Wallis

"All sorts of plans are put forth under the banner of growth, with little or no analysis of the way they might promote growth—except growth in federal spending. The same spending plans, on the other hand, are often described as reasons for wanting growth. . . .

"There are a number of important considerations that merit close examination. The Soviet threat is one of these. . . . First, it should be pointed out that we have a commanding lead over Russia in terms of both total and per capita output. Even if Russian growth rates continue higher than ours, the absolute gap between us will continue to increase for some time to come.

"Second, we don't know how large the gap really is—except that it is large. . . . International comparisons, even if we had good data, are a difficult and unrewarding business. We don't know whether Russian gross national product is one-half of ours or one-quarter of ours.

"Third, international comparisons of rates of growth can be even more misleading than comparisons of levels of output. The Russians, starting from a lower economic base and in a period of postwar reconstruction, should be expected to have a fairly high percentage rate of expansion. . . . Russian growth is more rapid because they are still in the area where improvement is easy and the way has been shown, whereas we are more heavily involved in the difficult tasks of expanding productivity in medicine, journalism, education, engineering and other services.

Russia will not
catch up

"In short, there is no possibility that the Russian economy will overtake ours, at any time in the visible future—certainly not in this century. . . .

"Unmet social needs is a slogan we hear these days as a call for accelerated growth. . . . One of the more pretentious versions of the 'needs' argument is that we have shameful public squalor in the midst of vulgar private opulence. This argument has a strong authoritarian smell, an odor of desire to enforce the advocates' tastes on others. . . .

"The argument about 'public squalor' would be laughed out of court if confronted with the facts of the past decade on construction of schools, improvements in teachers' salaries, super-highways built, increases in the support of research, expansion in aid to the needy, diseases conquered, urban redevelopment, hospitals built, or indeed almost anything else. . . .

"For a variety of reasons there is general agreement that economic growth is an important goal of economic policy. But . . . growth is only one of several major goals of economic policy.

"Economic freedom, stability of employment, stability of the general price level, economic efficiency, and economic security all are important. Properly conceived and pursued, economic growth is compatible with all these other goals; but it becomes incompatible when pursued too ardently or by inappropriate means. . . .

"New machines may reduce prematurely not only the value of old machines but also the value of human skills acquired through long training and experience. New products may reduce the incomes of those producing old products. New industries in new locations may uproot homes and communities near old industries. Unless the costs of economic growth are equitably distributed, it is only reasonable to expect strong resistance to growth and its accompanying changes.

"To get high rates of growth through more rapid capital accumulation means that people must save more, either voluntarily or by compulsion. . . . As much as Americans want economic growth, compulsions and depressed levels of consumption are costs which they would not willingly pay except in dire emergency." ("Economic Growth: What, Why, How," Address, Third Annual Loeb Awards Presentation, June 8, 1960)

OR PUBLIC BILLS?

Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. stresses the public sector.

**Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr.**

"If a quarter of the talent and resources now devoted in the United States to fabricating and titillating consumer wants were devoted instead to building the power and skill of the nation, we would have nothing to fear from Soviet competition. But, so long as we continue in the United States to prefer private indulgence to public need, so long as we allow consumer spending to determine how we use our national wealth, so long as we do not face up to the problem of a wise allocation of our national resources—so long the Soviet Union will continue to gain on us and eventually will overtake and surpass us. . . .

"If we are planning to stay in the ring as a great nation, we . . . shall have to begin purposefully to focus our national energies in ways which will give us the things a great nation must have—defense, foreign assistance, education, medical care, scientific research, resources and energy development, elimination of private poverty, and so on—even if these things don't make profits for private business in the market.

"The painless way to assure a larger allocation of resources to public purposes and to the forgotten areas of the private economy is to enlarge the total quantity of available resources—which means to pursue a policy of stimulating economic growth. . . .

"Yet suppose that we lack the wit to induce a sufficiently high rate of economic growth to provide for growth both in public investment and private consumption: what then? Confronted by the choice between improving our standard of living and doing what must be done for survival, then obviously the nation must forget its standard of living: if we fail to survive as a free nation, then televisions and tailfins will provide inadequate consolation. No one likes taxes. But there is no reason to suppose that either our present living standards or our present taxes or tax rates are sacred. There are unexplored possibilities in taxation—not only plugging loopholes, such as percentage depletion on oil, but taxing *things* to help people, such as, for example, a tax on advertising. If we don't grow more, then we must tax more—unless we are content to end up as the second-best nation. . . .

"The deeper American tradition has never been one of concern with *things*; that is why the consumer-spending philosophy is so aberrant. It has been a tradition of concern for *people*. . . . Investment in people is the only foundation on which we can build our national future.

**Tax rates
are not sacred**

"What does investment in people mean? It means putting an adequate share of resources into improving their education, their medical care, their communities, their economic status, their defense. It means national leadership to enlarge their opportunities and guarantee their equal liberties and rights. It means a recognition of the absolute importance of giving every young man or woman in America a chance in our national life proportionate to talent and character, whatever may be their race, their religion, their color, their social or economic origin." (*The Big Decision: Private Indulgence or National Power*, a memorandum)

OR PLENTY OF BOTH IN A ROW?

The former chief economic adviser to President Truman argues that we need a substantial increase in the rate of growth in both the public and private sectors of the economy rather than a shift of resources from one to the other.

Leon H. Keyserling

"It has become fashionable for liberals to say that we should cut back on the private consumption of luxuries and even *necessities* (principally by higher tax rates) in order to channel more resources into essential public programs. . . . The current crusade against private consumption is, in my opinion, a highly erroneous one.

"It is economically in error because, during the past seven years or longer, we have experienced a long-term and serious rise in unemployment of plant and manpower, resulting not only from deficiencies in public outlays, but also from deficiencies in private consumption and investment. . . .

"To be sure, federal investment in our public needs should have been much higher during the past seven years. But this should not have been accompanied by higher tax rates or other measures to repress private consumption *until* total private and public spending became high enough to exert undue pressure upon our productive output. . . . Efforts to 'balance the budget' when unemployment of plant and manpower is high and rising are self-defeating from the viewpoint of the budget and the national economy. The revenues resulting from higher economic growth would have come much closer to balancing public budgets despite much higher outlays. . . .

"To use our productive resources reasonably fully, we must achieve about \$350 billion *more* of total national product . . . between now and the end of 1964 than we shall have if there is a repeat performance of the very low growth rate of the past seven years. To devote most of this immense difference to expanded public programs would require that the federal budget be approximately *doubled* almost at once—a procedure bearing no relationship to the desirable speed-up of public programs. Instead, the racing new technology calls imperatively for a balanced expansion of *both* private consumption and public programs.

"Of course, the new white Cadillac Eldorados which some people buy every year, and the new luxury hotels at Miami and Palm Springs, stand in vivid contrast to overcrowded classrooms and odoriferous cities. But they stand in equally vivid contrast to the magnificent public bridges and roads in some of our cities, and the private poverty in the slums in close proximity. And even some of our recently burgeoning public universities, with hundreds of millions in endowments, are building luxuriously wasteful eating halls and recreation centers, while the poor who live nearby can't send their children through high school.

"Actually, there is little evidence that during the past quarter century

Public and private
splendor

our private economic progress has outrun our public progress. In absolute terms, we have made tremendous advances in schools and public hospitals and the other markers of public endeavor, just as we have made tremendous economic progress in private well-being. But measured against the technology of today, we are grossly delinquent on both fronts.

"Specifically, more than 40 million Americans, including multiple-person families and individuals living alone, are now trying to make ends meet on incomes falling below the established requirements to support even minimum health and a decent standard of living. . . .

"More public services alone will not remedy this evil. The removal of poverty is basically a matter of private income improvement through industrial advances which provide more work opportunity for more people at better pay, social security expansion, improved minimum wage laws, public aid to help reduce the high cost to consumers of adequate housing and medical care, and so forth. . . .

"If American consumers, even while their total consumption is too low, are spending too much for 'the wrong goods' and too little for 'the right goods,' the problem is educational, not economic. And if, with total consumer spending too low, some consumers can afford to spend too much for luxuries, while other consumers cannot afford to spend enough for necessities, the problem is to promote shifts in the distribution of total consumer income, not to reduce total consumer spending—and above all, not to reduce it regressively, which inadequate expansion of total consumption usually does. . . .

"The worldwide situation should warn us against insisting that we can serve one great purpose only by neglecting others. The determination of the Soviets to use their existing total output in accord with their relative priorities of need never for a moment blinds them to the fact that they must achieve a maximum rate of over-all economic growth, and therefore be able to sustain more and more varieties of advance. . . .

"If we respond to this challenge correctly instead of being panicked by it, we shall use our intrinsically superior economic and political systems to keep ahead on all important fronts. . . . We shall not say that going beyond the New Deal and the Fair Deal calls for a return to the earlier concepts of nineteenth century socialism—based upon the redistribution of economic scarcity." ("Less for Private Spending?" *The New Republic*, May 23, 1960)

OR NATIONALIZATION FIRST?

Richard Crossman, Labour Member of Parliament, argues that neither public nor private spending will enable the West to meet the "creeping crisis" of Communist economic advance so long as the money to pay for essentials is merely a by-product of private industry's profits.

R. H. S. Crossman

"One of the most alarming symptoms of Western decadence is the modern tendency to treat the liberties of the citizen as a 'weakness' of democracy and to explain the successes of the Kremlin by pointing to the 'obvious' advantages any Communist leader has as the unquestioned head of a totalitarian state. The reverse, of course, is true. All the weaknesses of communism derive from the crude brutalities of the one-party state and the absence of the institutions of civil liberty — an independent judiciary, an independent civil service, independent organs of public opinion and truly voluntary organizations, including trade unions. Those who imagine that Russian Communism would be weakened if Khrushchev

The power
to act

succeeds in liberalizing the system and encourages the growth of these free institutions are under a grave delusion. If the Russian Communists could really add these democratic strengths to the strength of a Socialist state which has already conquered irresponsible economic power and subjected it to public control, they would make their system irresistible.

"What enables the Communist states to achieve their successes — despite all the inefficiencies and brutalities perpetrated by their totalitarian rulers — is the fact that their governments possess 1) the power to take vital decisions and the knowledge on which to base them, and 2) the political and social instruments by means of which those vital decisions can be put into effect. A Communist government, for example, can allocate the national resources according to a system of priorities, allotting so much to producer goods, so much to consumer goods, so much to health, education, defense, thereby reducing the hazards of investment and accelerating development. In contrast, the government of a Western democracy, even under the post war system of managed capitalism, cannot even begin to draw up a national resources budget of this kind, far less put it into effect. . . .

Deliberate
defeat

"When faced with clear evidence that the Russians are rapidly overtaking it in the nuclear race, many of us assumed that the Eisenhower Administration would feel itself compelled to allocate enough of the national resources to nuclear warfare in order to keep ahead. No doubt the White House would have liked to do so, but it proved impossible. Although he knew that the present levels of American defense spending would permit the Russians to forge ahead, Mr. Eisenhower has preferred to accept defeat in the nuclear race. As a Socialist, I do not myself believe that, by accepting Russian dominance in nuclear weapons, the Americans subject themselves to any very acute military risks. But the American politicians and Big Businessmen who refused to increase the defense budget did so though they were convinced that they were thereby putting their country in the deadliest peril.

Depending
on waste

"Nothing could demonstrate more clearly than this the inherent contradiction which ensures that, in our 'affluent society,' while the individual grows rapidly more comfortable, the community becomes even more rapidly weaker and weaker. For the inherent inability of the system to allocate sufficient resources for national defense is repeated in relation to education, scientific development, health and welfare services. *The price which the modern, managed capitalism pays for avoiding the old-fashioned crisis of mass unemployment is the continuous sacrifice of public service, community welfare and national security to private profit. . . .*

"If the health of the Western economies depends on artificially creating an ever more extravagant demand for increasingly unnecessary consumer goods, then the maintenance of public services must *always* take second place to the satisfaction of private consumer needs. For the money to pay for these public services derives from taxation, whose level, so long as the private sector dominates the economy, must depend on the profitability of industry. . . .

"Less than a decade of expanding prosperity has been sufficient to erase from the voter's mind the doubts and anxieties about Western free enterprise which were still so powerful when the war finished; and to engender a complacent optimism which dismisses nationalization as an obsolete concept, with no relevance to the second half of the twentieth century. It is worth noticing, however, that these bland assumptions are challenged as soon as one leaves the North Atlantic area. Whatever doctrinal

Winning
where it counts

differences there may be between the Communists of Russia and of China, of Poland and of Czechoslovakia, they all agree on the premise that, outside agriculture, old-fashioned nationalization is the prerequisite for the kind of national planning necessary to achieve a balanced economic development.

"Which of these assumptions, the Western or the Eastern, is justified by the facts? The best judges, surely, are the leaders of the uncommitted peoples. Though their preference may be for the Western way of life, they have little doubt who, in the last decade, has been winning the peaceful competition between East and West. They can see that, in a Western democracy today, life is far freer and far more comfortable for far more of the citizens than ever before in the history of the human race. Given a free choice between living in capitalist West Germany or Communist East Germany, for example, a majority of Germans opt for the West. Judged in terms of that individualistic 'pursuit of happiness' which the American founding fathers laid down as the aim of their Republic, communism is still an inferior way of life compared to that of the affluent societies of the West. But this does not alter the fact that, *in terms of military power, of industrial development, of technological advance, of mass literacy and, eventually, of mass consumption too, the planned socialist economy, as exemplified in the Communist states, is proving its capacity to outpace and overtake the wealthy and comfortable Western economies.* . . .

"The enormous lead held by the West in 1945 is being narrowed by two factors. The first of these factors is the contrast between the economic use of resources possible under the planned economies of the East and the wastefulness of the artificially induced obsolescence which is the motive force of our affluent societies of the West. The second reason why the Communists are overhauling us is the fact that whereas, in their planned economies, inflation can be brought under control by planned income distribution, it is still the scourge of our managed Western capitalism. . . . The combination of these two factors has already set in motion a historic shift in the balance of world power which may well, before the 1960s are out, have demonstrated in the most decisive way possible the victory of nationalization over free enterprise.

Pretending
the problem away

"At first the technological and economic achievements of the Communists were blandly disregarded. Now that it is impossible to deny their reality, three arguments are employed in order to depreciate their importance and allay the alarm they have caused. We are told 1) that, while the 'great leap forward' is natural enough in backward economies, starting on the early stages of industrialization, this rate of increase is bound to slow down as the absolute strength of the Communist states approaches that of the West; 2) that the Russian sputnik and other achievements in rocketry are the results of quite abnormal concentration of effort, such as a totalitarian state can always make and from which no conclusion can be drawn about the general efficiency of the system; and, finally, 3) that, as living standards improve and education spreads, a new public opinion will be created in the Communist states, with liberalistic demands for extensions of freedom and a shift of balance from production to consumption industries. Provided, therefore, that nuclear war can be avoided, we are assured that we can look forward for the next fifty years to a period of peaceful competition, in which the intrinsic differences between communism and Western capitalism will become less and less marked as the backward Communist nations gradually find fulfillment in a Western 'pursuit of happiness.'

**Shrinking frontiers
of democracy**

"I am not surprised that, with the change in the balance of power, the fulminations against the wickedness of communism and the aggressive menace of the Kremlin's designs have been replaced, in Washington as well as in London, by such comforting predictions. But what does surprise and alarm me is that some Socialist economists should have joined in peddling these complacent illusions." There is immediate need for "a new Socialist critique, applied both to the Western and to the Eastern economies, which would enable us to foresee and prepare for the 'creeping crisis' that will confront the West before the end of this decade. . . .

"What will finally confront us . . . will not be a return of the mass unemployment of the 1930s but a shrinking of the frontiers of democracy as the world balance of power shifts and the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa accept the economic aid and political leadership of the Communists in the modernization of their communities. If the Kremlin were manned by Cold Warriors determined to overrun the West by a display of aggressive brinkmanship, the decline of Western power which we are now witnessing might well result in a series of international crises. *In terms of military strength, it is now within the capacity of the Russian and Chinese Communists to force a showdown on such issues as Berlin, Persia and Formosa and to confront the Western powers with a choice between nuclear suicide and a series of Munich-type surrenders. . . .*

"No one can exclude the possibility of a series of surrenders of this kind. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that this is the main danger which the West now faces. It seems to me probable that the Communists have taken our measure fairly accurately. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev probably appreciates that the only thing which can rally the West and force it to mobilize its strength is a repetition of the kind of strong-arm action which we saw in the Berlin blockade and the attack on South Korea. In an actual war, or under direct threat of military aggression, the affluent societies of the West can be persuaded to cut back their ostentatious spending and accept a degree at least of national planning and international cooperation. *Though Mao Tse-tung may be tempted to follow a Stalinite line, it seems to me unlikely that Khrushchev will commit the mistake of saving the Western powers from the comfortable process of peace-time degeneration on which they have now begun.* For the Kremlin is now convinced that the only thing which could prevent the ultimate victory of world communism is nuclear war. Their determination to practice peaceful coexistence, therefore, is a sign not of weakness but of confidence. When they challenge us to disarm immediately and enter into peaceful competition, they do so because they are sure they will win the contest.

A prosperous backwater

"Which system is best equipped for rapidly modernizing the underdeveloped territories, raising their living standards and helping to provide mass education—the Western affluent society or Eastern communism? The Kremlin is sure that, in the course of the next twenty years, the North Atlantic area will become a prosperous backwater, while vast areas of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and, finally, South America—which at present still accept some of our ideals of freedom and still look to us for assistance—are absorbed into the Communist bloc. Recent history supports their confidence. Anyone who suggested ten years ago that the new Aswan dam would be financed by Russia and constructed by Russian engineers would have been dismissed as either a fellow traveller or a defeatist. Even five years ago it would have been difficult to take seriously the prediction that a Cuban Government in 1959 would be entertaining Mr. Mikoyan and considering the possibility of buying Russian arms with

**Public control
of world trade**

which to defend its freedom from mainland interference. The fact that these two 'absurdities' have become sober truth illustrates the shift in the balance of power, and they will be followed throughout the 1960s by even more humiliating examples, unless we are prepared radically to transform the nature of our affluent societies and, in particular, their economic relations with Asia and Africa. . . .

"What matters in relations with Asia and Africa is not what ordinary people think and feel but what economic policies our Governments adopt. . . . The colonial peoples are bound to . . . regard us as enemies if our Governments decide that our economic relations with those countries should for the most part be conducted by private financial and business interests, whose sole concern it must be to buy cheap and sell dear. *It is not sufficient merely to wind up colonialism, in the sense of ending the direct administration of these territories by European officials. What is even more important is to end indirect colonialism, and that can only be done by subordinating all private enterprise in our trade with these ex-colonial areas to strict public control.* Until that is done, no British Colombo Plan or American program of economic aid, however ambitious, can halt the advance of Communist influence in Asia and Africa. This advance has already begun and will proceed even more rapidly in the course of this decade.

"How will the Western people react when they are confronted with what will seem to them a shameful and inexplicable series of diplomatic reverses and withdrawals? There are some who will claim that public opinion will not be stirred out of its complacency. . . . It is far more likely that . . . a deep revulsion will set in. Gradually our peoples will be shaken out of their comfortable affluence. Gradually their eyes will be opened to the threat to democratic values which for years has been concealed from them by Governments systematically appeasing the private profit-makers at the cost of public service and public enterprise. And one day anger will replace complacency. There will be a return of that sense of betrayal and that readiness to repudiate the 'guilty men' with which the British people, in November 1938, awoke to the crimes of appeasement. . . .

"But this time there will be no enemy to fight and the object will be to make the community capable not of winning a war but of holding its own in a peaceful competition, which will decide whether the pattern of world government will be democratic or totalitarian socialism. In 1940 Mr. Churchill asked only for a temporary subordination of private profit-making to the public interest, and five years after that war was over he himself headed the Government which reasserted the primacy of the private over the public interest. This time the 'commanding heights of the economy' must be captured and held permanently for the public interest."

**Safeguards
for freedom**

Transferring gigantic powers to the central government and its agencies would, of course, involve dangers to freedom, even possible degeneration into totalitarianism. There must be a counter-balancing expansion of constitutional and judicial safeguards of personal freedom, a revival of Parliament's traditional function of controlling and checking the executive, and a curbing of the oligarchic tendencies both in the trade unions and in the party machines.

What we have been witnessing instead is the loss of freedom to a modern feudalism: oligopoly economic power controlled neither by government nor by free competition. The only way to check this new despotism, "enlarge freedom and achieve a full democracy is to subject the economy to public control." ("Labour in the Affluent Society," *Fabian Tract* 325, The Fabian Society, June 1960)

MAKING ECONOMIC AID EFFECTIVE

THE CLASS STRUGGLE BETWEEN NATIONS

In a resolution drafted by them for the Second Inter-American Conference for Democracy and Freedom, the former President of Costa Rica and the former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil analyze some of the problems of development and offer a program.

**José Figueres
and
Adolf A. Berle, Jr.**

**Capital formation
then and now**

"What is happening in the international economy today is an approximate repetition of the course followed by each of the present industrial countries, internally, during the last two hundred years. Minorities accumulated the scant wealth produced by whole societies. Minorities cultivated the arts and the incipient technology. More than social injustice there was, perhaps, lack of knowledge, and the work of the nation had a low yield. As the means to produce abundance were developed, there came, by coincidence or by necessity, the social forces that imposed a wider distribution of national income. This benefited the majorities directly. And as a consequence internal markets were enlarged, bringing about the present inducement to an ever larger production.

"The drama is now being re-enacted, not in the relations between rich minorities within the advanced societies, but in the economic intercourse between the few enriched and the many 'proletarian' peoples of today.

"There are many similarities between the historic social movement, now nearly finished within the advanced countries, and the new international economic struggle, now beginning. It is hardly necessary to stress the parallel. Rather, to diminish errors we should point at the differences between the two processes, born from changing circumstances and time.

"For example, savings and capital accumulation were relatively easy in Europe and the United States at a time when social aspirations had not been awakened, and when the tendency to consume was held in check by the political power of the well-to-do minorities. Today, the retarded countries that are trying to adopt or maintain democracy have to cope with modern social pressures, exerted by the growing power of the majorities. Consumers are also voters, and this makes the national sacrifices of capital formation difficult. If the countries of the Soviet bloc are saving a high proportion of their output, it is because their present rulers have as much political power to enforce capitalization as the rich minorities of the Western world had a century ago.

"To such internal difficulties of capital formation in the underdeveloped democracies, one has to add the new international facts of economic life. Most of the poor countries (certainly all of the Latin American republics) depend to a great extent on their primary exports, and experience a growing tendency to consume industrial imports. In this relatively intense external trade, they pay prices that represent the higher standards of the advanced countries, and in exchange they receive prices that reflect their own modest living. Buying dear and selling cheap in the world market does not make savings and capitalization easy for the 'proletarian' nations of today.

"When outside capital is invested in these countries, the lack of know-

**A program for
Latin America**

ledge of international economics (more than a deliberate 'imperialism') allows investments to work as suction pumps, siphoning off most of the new capital created into the investing countries.

"This situation is maintained by the ignorance or neglect of the ruling classes of Latin America, and by the power of the ruling classes of the richer nations. Government people assume that foreign investments are, per se, a substitute for local patrimony and the magic cure for all ills. Exporters in the poor countries, guided by the profit motive, are only interested in establishing a margin between local wages and export prices. They compete with one another, underselling, unmindful of the fact that they are exploiting their own peoples, to the short-range benefit of the richer nations. On the other hand the businessmen of the advanced countries, checked at home by political and social forces, and taxed to pay for public services, find their power less fettered when they deal with the weaker peoples abroad. Laissez-faire has been bridled within advanced Western societies, but it is still rampant in international trade. . . .

"The only way to avoid a relative worsening of conditions in the underdeveloped world is to establish political and ethical checks on the power of the ruling classes, and to regulate international commerce."

The following principles for governing economic relations between the U.S. and Latin American countries exporting primary products were proposed by Figueres and Berle and adopted by the Conference:

"1. Recognize the necessity of the stabilization of the international market of primary products, as a means of establishing equitable terms of trade. To this effect, stimulate international agreements on basic commodities, quota systems and the establishment of world reserves. A stable and just income is the first requisite for economic development.

"2. Recognize as just the aspiration of the less developed countries, of gradually acquiring, by legitimate means, the property over such foreign investments as they may wish to own locally. International credit institutions such as the World Bank should favor this process. Permanent outside ownership, when carried on in a large proportion with respect to local wealth, may constitute a new version of colonialism, with some of its economic and political consequences.

"3. In trying to inject foreign capital for development, give preference to loans of appropriate terms and interest rates, over direct investments. Amortizing well-invested credit is now a generalized way of forming capital. 'Invest now and save later' seems to express the degree of sacrifice that many modern consumers accept.

"4. Recognize the social function of property and of economic activities, the responsibility of the state in regulating and even in fostering the economy, and the character of public servants that modern businessmen have, in this social conception.

"5. The proportion of private and public enterprise should be determined by each country according to its circumstances. The success attained by certain Latin American entities, public or mixed, in fostering economic development, shows that it is a mistake to oppose such institutions, and that they should rather be encouraged and financed.

"6. Modern enterprises should be considered, among their other functions, as instruments for the country's capitalization. Whenever possible, the national economy should be so organized that the capital accumulated by enterprises, coming from profits made within each country, shall remain available for the continuous development of that nation. Purchases of

common stock in foreign companies, by local individuals or institutions, like pension funds and social security [funds], should be encouraged.

"7. The profits of foreign companies should be exclusively taxed in the country where they operate. This principle should be strengthened by means of double-taxation treaties.

"8. Stimulate economic planning, common markets, and the tendency towards integration. As a step to total integration, it is advisable to divide the Latin American continent into sub-regions, sub-groups, or areas of activities. Special circumstances, such as those of Venezuela, should be taken into consideration.

"9. The industrial countries should not encourage in their own territory the activities that can be easily carried on by the less developed peoples, but rather import the corresponding articles from them, and so make it possible for them to buy the products of advanced technology or heavy industry.

"10. In view of the importance of primary products for Latin American economies, research for artificial or synthetic substitutes should not be encouraged. The total or partial disappearance of the market for natural coffee, for example, would be a catastrophe for the hemisphere and for the world.

"11. In economic dealings with governments, show disapproval of corrupt, dictatorial, or dynastic regimes. Encourage honest, legitimate government by delegation. It is inconsistent and illusory to try to match alleged economic efficiency with recognized political vice.

"12. International economic relations should be ruled by knowledge, justice and solidarity. They should follow the principle of equal compensation for equal effort. They should be a means to harmonious world development. They should help all nations to attain high levels of living, education, health, and social well-being. They should foster civilization and peace." (Submitted at Caracas, Venezuela, April 1960)

The retiring President of the Society for International Development and former Director General of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration revises Marx.

Hugh L. Keenleyside

"Recent figures indicate that the developed countries of the West are adding to their productive investment at the rate of about 10 per cent of their annual income. This means that an average of about \$90 per capita is going into the purchase of new plant and equipment, which in turn results in the creation of more wealth. In the pre-industrial countries of Asia and Africa, on the other hand, the total per capita income is only roughly \$60 a year. In other words the people of the West are saving more than the people of Asia and Africa are receiving for all purposes.

"It is not surprising that the gap between the haves and the have-nots is steadily opening. How wide that gap is can be gauged from the fact that the industrial nations of the free world with only a third of its population and a fourth of its land area produce 86 per cent of its manufactured goods. The two-thirds of the population of the free world who occupy 75 per cent of its land produce 14 per cent of its manufactures. The rich are still getting richer; the only luxury of the poor is procreation.

"It is not inconceivable that the Marxian belief in the inevitable widening of the gap between rich and poor, having been proved false in Western industrial society, may yet demonstrate an unexpected validity in the international scene." ("Obstacles and Means," *International Development Review*, May 1960)

CHINA AND RUSSIA

ARE THEY DRIFTING APART?

In a speech before the congress of the Rumanian Workers (Communist) Party, the Soviet Premier insists that "only madmen and maniacs launch calls for a new world war."

Nikita Khrushchev

"We cannot repeat today mechanically what V. I. Lenin said many decades ago about imperialism and always repeat that imperialist wars are inevitable as long as socialism has not triumphed all over the world. . . .

"We live in a time when we have neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin with us. If we act like children who, studying the alphabet, compile words from letters, we shall not go very far. . . .

"Under present conditions war is not inevitable." (Address in Bucharest, June 21, 1960)

Some observers feel that the mechanical repetition that Khrushchev scorned comes from Peking:

Yu Chao-II

"Should we be afraid if the war maniacs, against the will of the people of the world, unleash a war? Comrade Mao Tse-tung has given a Marxist-Leninist reply to this question in his work 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.' He said: 'We stand resolutely for peace and oppose war. But if the imperialists insist on unleashing another war, we should not be afraid of it. Our attitude on this question is the same as our attitude toward all "disturbances": 1) we are against it; 2) we are not afraid of it. World War I was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. World War II was followed by the emergence of the Socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to Socialism. Then there will not be much room left in the world for the imperialists, while it is quite likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse. . . .

"All peace-loving people in the world, unite! . . . If only we can thwart the imperialist plans . . . we shall most assuredly be able to continue to check imperialist wars, preserve world peace, and advance toward the goal of winning a lasting peace." ("On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times, or On the Way for All Peoples to Struggle for Peace," *Red Flag* (Peking), Nov. 7, 1959)

An American analyst of Communist affairs, Donald S. Zagoria, concludes that the factors making for unity in the Sino-Soviet alliance are dominant, but also finds signs of deterioration.

Donald S. Zagoria

"Evidences of discord—and they have been numerous in recent months—obviously do not prove that the end of the Sino-Soviet alliance is near, much less that the Russians are seeking an accommodation with the West largely out of fear of Communist China. Nevertheless, they do seem to indicate that the strains are more serious and affect more aspects of Sino-Soviet relations than ever before. . . .

**Peking's
pretensions**

"The Chinese Communists, for all their protestations of loyalty to Soviet leadership of the bloc, are already 'moving the papacy to Avignon' and putting forward Peking as the fountainhead of Communist orthodoxy. They regard Mao as the foremost theoretician of the Communist world today; they confidently believe not only that the CPC leadership is the best judge of how to build socialism and communism in China, but also that the Chinese model of socialist construction is in many respects more relevant than the Soviet for underdeveloped countries, particularly those in Asia; and as ideological purists they regard with suspicion the patent opportunism of some of Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policies.

"The Russians, on the other hand, are plainly annoyed at Mao's willfulness and ideological pretensions. They believe that the CPC is making serious errors in the building of socialism in China; they refuse to accept Peking's claim that some of its practices might be applicable elsewhere in the bloc; and they regard some Chinese policies as manifestations of 'left-wing adventurism.' . . .

"Divergent Chinese and Soviet attitudes towards ideology itself . . . are another divisive element. Perhaps because their own revolution is much younger, the Chinese Communists are imbued with an extraordinarily zealous, if not mystical, faith in the power of the Marxist ideology, and with the determination to keep it pure. There is a strong conviction . . . that ideological and organizational work can overcome all obstacles. . . . There is an uncompromising hostility towards any dilution of the faith, evidenced by the fact that the fiercest attacks on Yugoslav communism have come from Communist China. There is a grim determination 'to build communism' at breakneck speed regardless of the absence of the material prerequisites. There is a strong tendency towards egalitarianism. Finally, there is scorn for the strength of the capitalist world, coupled with adamant refusal to believe that 'imperialism' can change its character, or that the capitalist nations are not unalterably bent on destroying the Communist bloc.

**Moscow's
pragmatism**

"On the other hand, the Soviet Union's more advanced stage of development as well as Khrushchev's temperament make for a more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to economic problems at home, to relations with the Yugoslavs and foreign policy in general. . . . Although some steps have been taken to correct the gross inequalities of the Stalin era, there are no signs of a revival of early Bolshevik egalitarianism. In its economic policies, the Soviet leadership . . . takes a more realistic view of human nature and the need for incentive to spur productivity; and there seems to be greater recognition of the strength, as well as the peaceful intentions, of the capitalist West. . . .

"It is unquestionably in the sphere of Communist international strategy that Sino-Soviet differences have become most apparent and acute. . . . Several explanations can be offered for Chinese Communist opposition to Khrushchev's policy of relaxing international tension. First, the Peking leadership seems to believe that conditions of external tension are necessary to enable it to exact from the population the sacrifices required by its frenetic program for building socialism. Secondly, the Chinese leaders probably fear that friendlier Soviet relations with the United States will heighten their own isolation and lead to a freezing of the Far Eastern status quo, depriving them of Taiwan and reducing the chances of spreading Communist China's influence and power in Asia, as well as in Africa and the Middle East.

"A third reason seems to be that Soviet strides in weapons technology have given rise to divergent Chinese and Soviet strategic assumptions. Since

**Attitude
on war**

the first Soviet sputnik launching and ICBM test in the fall of 1957, Chinese Communist propaganda has heavily stressed Soviet military superiority and Western weakness, while Moscow has shown much less inclination to underrate the West militarily. The Peking leadership seems to believe that the Soviet advance in weapons since 1957 has radically altered the balance of military power in favor of the Communist bloc, and that this advantage should be exploited by pursuing a much more assertive foreign policy than is presently being followed by Khrushchev. In short, the Chinese evidently favor a policy of 'brinkmanship' on the assumption that the West . . . will not be provoked into a counteraction that would precipitate an all-out war.

"There is a fourth and final factor which seems to be at the heart of the conflicting Chinese and Soviet approaches to the international situation. Whereas Soviet foreign policy appears to reflect genuine fear of an all-out nuclear war and a desire to minimize the risks of such a catastrophe, Peking seems more insensitive to the dangers involved and willing to take much greater risks. Thus, Moscow has been increasingly frank in admitting that a nuclear war will result in mutual destruction and, since 1956, has been gradually adjusting its doctrine to the realities of a world menaced by nuclear annihilation. On the contrary, Peking refuses to concede that the Socialist camp will suffer intolerable losses in all-out war. . . .

"Peking seems to regard itself, and not the Russians, as the leaders of the anti-colonial movement in Asia, Africa, and perhaps even in the Middle East. It consequently must view with utmost dislike what it regards as opportunistic Soviet overtures to the colonial powers tending to impede nationalist revolution in these areas. Finally, the Chinese leadership may also regard the Soviet policy as disadvantageous to the Communist bloc as a whole, on the theory that bloc objectives can best be served by halting fruitless negotiations with the colonial powers and stepping up Communist support of nationalist movements.

**Sharing
nuclear weapons**

"Perhaps the most sensitive issue between Moscow and Peking—and the one on which there is the least information—is that of Soviet willingness, or unwillingness, to share nuclear weapons with Communist China. While the Russians have probably been aiding China's efforts to develop a nuclear capability of its own, there is reason to believe that Moscow has thus far held back from agreeing to supply . . . Soviet nuclear weapons. . . .

"That the strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance are numerous and acute is, in the writer's view, no longer open to question; but that they are, or will soon become, severe enough to produce an open break is improbable. . . . Khrushchev has demonstrated much greater flexibility than his all-powerful predecessor, and Mao is certainly no Trotskyite firebrand. . . . Both are undoubtedly still counting on presiding over the disintegration of the West before turning hostile attention to each other. Finally, Peking cannot for the time being do without Soviet military and economic assistance.

"To say that an open split is unlikely in the near future is not, however, to minimize either the gravity of Sino-Soviet differences—which are intimately bound up with real divergences of national interest—or Peking's determination to pursue an independent course in the face of Soviet pressure whenever it feels its interests jeopardized by Soviet policies. The Chinese have acted in defiance of Moscow's objections in pushing ahead with the commune program at home, and they have challenged Soviet leadership of the bloc by proselytizing among the other bloc Communist parties for the acceptance of Chinese viewpoints and policies. They have not only refused to alter their tactics towards the West even after 'comradely discussions' with Khrushchev, but have intensified their attacks on the latter's tactics

**Suzanne Labin
and
Christopher Emmet**

and policies. In all this, there are the makings of further serious conflict between the two Communist giants.

"In the final analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese Communists' capacity to pursue independent policies will become progressively greater as China is transformed into a major industrial and nuclear power. In the next several years, as the Chinese pursue their furious efforts to become a modern industrial and military power, and barring any radical change in Western policy toward the Mao regime, the present neo-Stalinist characteristics of Chinese communism are likely to persist, causing an accentuation of Sino-Soviet divergences. Khrushchev, therefore, can probably find little comfort in the words of General Liu Ya-lou, commander of the Chinese Communist air force, who in May 1958 asserted that when Communist China has advanced industrially and technologically to the point of being able to produce its own nuclear weapons, 'another new turning point will probably appear in the international situation.' " ("Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1960)

The notion that Russia may be afraid of China is a ruse to fool the West, according to Suzanne Labin, author of La Condition Humaine en Chine Communiste, and Christopher Emmet, chairman of the American Friends of the Captive Nations.

"The West does not wish to see communism and desperately grasps at any straw which offers relief from the frustrating and painful tensions of the omnipresent conflict. The image of Communist China as an 'aggressive threat' to the Soviet Union is as pernicious to Western policy as the old theory of Mao as the helpless prisoner of Moscow.

"The Soviets are the very creators of that Chinese power which, it is now argued, may be fatal to them. . . . In what concerns the essential activities of a modern state, China will be chained to Russia for decades. How, then, can the Chinese Communist Party threaten Khrushchev, and why should Khrushchev tremble with anxiety over the industrialization of China, when he himself is building and controlling it? . . .

"China's apparently ill-timed aggression toward India, at the very moment when Soviet Russia's whole propaganda effort is devoted to the 'relaxation of tensions' . . . can best be accounted for on the assumption that Russia and China take turns in pressing the Communist offensive so that while one threatens, the other can seem to disapprove. When one makes an aggressive move, the other pretends to play the part of mediator. . . .

"Until recently, the Soviet Union . . . was forced to shoulder the full responsibilities which befall the aggressor. Now that Red China has become a power of stature, the Communists can carry out two policies simultaneously, one in Moscow, the other in Peking. This enables them not only to sustain a two-pronged offensive, but to confound thoroughly the policy-councils of the Western alliance.

"Whenever fundamental and inescapable issues come into play, the two accomplices find themselves in full agreement." This "does not exclude occasional disagreements over tactics and timing. . . . But to regard these frictions as symptoms of a profound rift is to indulge in dangerous wishful thinking. Short of some final break, the greater the friction between Russia and China, the more will Moscow and Peking be likely to conceal it. Conversely, if the alliance is solid, both powers will stand to gain by giving the impression that they are divided. They can accomplish this best by precisely what they have been doing—issuing official statements of unity while 'leaking' hints of disunity." ("Is There A Sino-Soviet Split?" *Orbis*, Spring 1960)

THE ROLE OF MILITARY ELITES

EGYPT'S ARMY-GUIDED DEMOCRACY

Middle East expert Morroe Berger, who is an associate professor of sociology at Princeton University, discusses the differences between the political roles of the military in the West and in the Middle East.

Morroe Berger

"In both economically advanced and underdeveloped countries, the military elites assume increasing importance as wars and the preparation for them engage more and more of a nation's resources, and as newly independent states impatiently strive to achieve national power and a higher standard of living." Unlike their Western counterparts, military elites in various Middle Eastern countries have played a key role in social change.

"Neither as wards of Europe nor as independent states has the Middle East been able to construct a viable liberalism. The landlord class, not numerous but powerful, had little interest in combating foreign control and none in arousing native political passions. The traditional middle class in the Western sense, the commercial, industrial and banking groups, were foreign or foreign-oriented and simply were not interested in nationalism or liberalism. The urban working class has been small, uneducated, hardly organized and too impoverished to care about ideologies. The peasants, numerous but weak and poor, lay outside the political community entirely. The professionals—the lawyers, doctors, literary men, journalists and the students who aspired to join them—became the keepers of the nationalist conscience along with the military elite in some cases. . . . Without a strong liberal or socialist party, trade unions or independent peasant organizations, liberalism and radicalism were hothouse plants which flourished among the intelligentsia and bore little or no relation to the social environment outside them. Because political power lay with the landed class in alliance with the Western-dominated monarchies, Arab liberals were isolated from the centers of power and could make no contribution to political life except one tied to the all-pervading nationalism whose rhetoric no group could avoid or resist. When they were nationalist they were heeded, when they were liberal they were largely ignored, both by the Arab holders of power and the Europeans behind them. . . . Consequently they could make no palpable gain in political influence or in promoting democracy or social welfare—that is, they could not enjoy even the modicum of success that in the West moderated the extreme left and gave it a sense of responsibility as it realized some of its immediate goals and came closer to political power. Instead, Arab liberals were left with only their ideology to embrace. . . .

**Stillbirth
of liberalism**

"Arab liberalism . . . finally withered just after World War II in the white heat of the Western insistence upon maintaining its special position in the Near East and of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the ensuing war. Moderation could not survive such blows to Arab hopes and expectations. The older propertied classes lost influence as foreign power declined and a new, more nationalist middle group waxed—an employed middle group of civil servants dependent upon Arab states now governing them-

**Armies as
schools**

selves at least in domestic affairs, of technicians and professionals who were Westernized without having been in the West, the products of Arab higher education systems which were . . . becoming secular, modern, nationalist.

"Once the Western powers withdrew from direct control over the Middle East, it appeared that any group, no matter what its ideology, would have to gain the support of the military elite to carry out its intentions. . . . The need for army support has sent all groups in the Middle East, of whatever political persuasion, to seek converts among the officers. This has had two effects. First, the armies became political schools. Second, liberalism, radicalism, nationalism, communism, socialism, religious fundamentalism—all have attracted various sections of the military elite. . . .

"Drawn from the urban and peasant middle classes, the native officers felt no traditional loyalty to such conservative classes as the large land-owners or the commercial interests—the former with strong Ottoman ties, the latter chiefly Western or Arab Christians. . . .

"Under British control the Egyptian Army was not an agency of social change but was itself an object of change. . . . Because the Egyptian officers had intimate and enduring tutelage under the British both in Egypt and in England, and because they formed a disciplined, cohesive unit by the nature of their calling and professional education, they became the strongest and most solid native elite familiar with Western patterns of the rationalized pattern of violence. . . . In the current era, therefore, the [Egyptian] army is a conscious, independent agent of social change. . . . In the West, army officers . . . have been connected to the upper governing classes by ties of family, education, and common interests in political stability.

**From peasants
to officers**

"As Naguib has himself pointed out, however, the social origin of Egyptian officers gave them little stake in existing social and political arrangements. 'Except for the royal family,' he says, 'there was no aristocracy, and the landowners' and traders' sons who might have led the armed forces were too busy enjoying their wealth to be bothered with military service. The officers' corps in consequence was largely composed of the sons of civil servants and soldiers and the grandsons of peasants.' . . . Of all the native elite groups, the army probably has held the most rationally calculating, secular, and unromantic approach to the problems which Egypt has faced. In this sense, it has been the most 'Western' of the elites. . . .

"The fact that the Egyptian officers do not follow a native aristocratic military tradition has probably facilitated their integration into the civilian government since 1952. . . . One was charged with revising the structure of the civil service, another is Minister of Culture and National Guidance and emphasizes the former as much as the latter, a third is a novelist and secretary-general of the official council of arts and letters, a fourth is in charge of cultural exchanges in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. . . . Their performance of these civilian functions has not been 'militaristic.'"

In their drive to modernize Egypt, the officers have stressed nationalism and industrialization. By mass propaganda, "they seek to weld all Egyptians into a conscious national unit and to make them leaders among the Arabs, Moslems and Africans who are undergoing the same kind of transformation." They have introduced reforms in education and social relationships. They have also tightened government control of economic, social and political life. These controls, supported by the apparatus of a modern state, are far more effective than similar ones attempted by previous regimes in the area. Political parties have been abolished; press, radio and professional bodies have been brought under control; the Government has intervened actively in the economic, cultural and religious spheres.

**Nonpolitical
liberalism**

**Farouk and
Nasser**

"This is the image of the country which the military elite would like to build—industrialized, militarily powerful, respected in the world community, and composed of educated, healthy citizens loyal to the nation-state. Nasser has often summarized this goal as socialism, cooperation, and democracy."

The Egyptian regime has equated democracy and freedom with national self-government. "The freedom of the individual to challenge such native rule is not accepted as a mode of political life, though differences of opinion are expressed as to the means by which the goals laid down by the regime may be attained. The regime does not feel free to permit an opposition in the traditional Western sense because it fears that, given wide public apathy, such an arrangement might enable deposed elites to return to power and reverse the trend toward modernization. . . . Not bound to the past, as were the elites they deposed and the masses they seek to arouse, the military elite feels it must impose change—and must therefore retain control of the state machinery. . . .

"Though it rejects Western parliamentary democracy (for the present only, it insists), it has not only permitted but even promoted liberalism in nonpolitical realms. It has broadened educational opportunity, supported efforts to overcome learning by rote, tried to develop education in science (traditionally neglected), and encouraged methods of education which permit freer expression of individuality. In public administration it has tried to encourage greater individual responsibility. . . . In family life it allows the growth of liberal ideas of child-rearing and above all the emancipation of women from seclusion through education and employment outside the home. In art and literature, the regime has encouraged new forms of expression and has not interfered with the growth of various schools so long as immediate political issues are avoided or . . . treated in accordance with the official position. All of these tendencies may be setting up pressures for increased personal freedom in the political realm as well. . . .

"Many observers have insisted that there was more freedom and democracy under Farouk." Farouk's Egypt and Nasser's represent two opposite types of regime in underdeveloped countries, the "pre-populist" and the "populist." The former "does not rest on public opinion and retains a considerable degree of freedom of action by ignoring the masses, by not drawing them into public life, by leaving them undisturbed in their private misery and political apathy. Such a regime can therefore allow greater political freedom at the top, to the articulate groups—the press, political parties, professionals, students." Nasser's "populist" regime, in contrast, suppresses the freedoms of the old elites but seeks to draw the peasants and urban workers into political life.

"The political process now does not embrace political parties and free parliaments but means 1) the single, mass organization to arouse and channel political consciousness, 2) the professional associations, peasant cooperatives, trade unions, and religious groups harnessed to the regime's goals, and 3) plebiscites and parliaments without political parties. . . . In such a society, where mass opinion is stirred out of its lethargy, the expression of any opinion becomes more significant because it is no longer confined to the thin articulate layer at the top. The 'pre-populist' regime allows more freedom at the top precisely because the bottom of the social hierarchy remains unaffected. The 'populist' regime suppresses freedom at the top because it may now penetrate the lower levels and have more serious consequences. . . .

"The 'populist' regime, I should say, offers more hope. Under the 'pre-

populist' regime it is not likely that the social and economic conditions conducive to freedom and democracy can be built. . . . Under the 'populist' regime political freedom is suppressed but at least the possibility of its growth remains." ("The Military Regimes in the Middle East," Address, General Conference, Congress for Cultural Freedom, Berlin, June, 1960)

LATIN AMERICA'S MILITARY POLITICS

In a study prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, the chairman of the department of history of the University of New Mexico criticizes United States military aid to Latin America.

Edwin Lieuwen

"The actual military power and war-making potential of the Latin American states count for practically nothing when compared with the major powers of the world. . . . The Rio military alliance, the MDA [Mutual Defense Assistance] pacts, the arms grants, the reimbursable aid, the work of the IADB [Inter-American Defense Board] and of the military missions—all these have no great military significance. They are designed, above all, to draw the Latin American officer corps, which exercise great influence over the political scene in most of the republics, closer to the United States. . . . Unintentionally and despite its efforts to keep the aid balanced as between the various receiving countries, the United States may be helping to arm Latin America against Latin America. . . . Certainly Trujillo's saber-rattling in the Caribbean and Somoza's massing of tanks and armored cars along the troubled Costa Rican border were made possible by our sales and grants of military equipment to those regimes. . . .

**Soldiers vs.
civilians**

"The strengthening of the armed forces . . . seems only to give encouragement to the Latin American officer corps to convert themselves into even more highly political instruments than they are already. . . . That the great majority of civilians, whose experience leads them to fear their own armed forces far more than they do the Russians, are opposed to these programs becomes apparent when one samples the mountain of criticism . . . by respected civilian political leaders."

Latin America is in the midst of a social revolution, but the old oligarchy and its military allies exploit U.S. hemispheric defense plans "not to stop Soviet aggression, but rather to stop social change. The result is that the opposing social forces, which comprise the majority of the population . . . hold the United States at least partially responsible for preserving the social order they felt they were well on the way toward destroying."

While existing commitments and special situations prevent immediate abandonment of the program, "the United States should gradually reduce its military aid, in general to the minimum amount necessary to keep the Latin American governments from seeking aid elsewhere. . . .

**Aid instead
of arms**

"By de-emphasizing the military aspects of its policy, the United States can help Latin America to attack its economic problems. . . . Where illiteracy is high, nourishment inadequate, disease widespread, and material poverty the rule, the ideological fight against communism is meaningless. . . .

"Since economic aid is intimately related to the problem of militarism . . . no aid should be granted to military regimes bent on preserving an outworn order. In fact, the United States should be wary of granting assistance to any military regime in Latin America, for the experience of the past has demonstrated that even when men in uniform have assumed leadership of the social revolution, they have shown little capacity for resolving their nations' problems in an orderly, progressive fashion." (*Arms and Politics in Latin America*)

REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM

THE FATE OF AGRARIAN REVOLT

A professor of economics at the University of Michigan, Dr. Boulding is a visiting teacher at the University of West Indies. After a trip to Cuba, he writes of the revolution of the country against the city and of the middle class against the landed aristocracy.

Kenneth Boulding

"Revolutions of the countryside against the city are an ancient phenomenon, and they are of particular importance in Latin America by contrast with the United States, where the essential unit of the society is the small town. . . . Havana, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires are brilliant capital cities of the European kind. The countrysides which support and feed them are miserable and poverty-stricken. This is highly characteristic of that state of man which has been described as civilization; civilization, after all, is what happens in cities, and in societies with merely civilized techniques, the brilliance of the city is bought at the cost of the degradation of the countryside.

"The revolution of the country against the city, however, is always either unsuccessful or disastrous. If it is unsuccessful, civilization survives; if it is successful, the result is disastrous. The city is overthrown; the country is still no better off. Most modern agrarian revolutions have been mainly unsuccessful and therefore only partly disastrous. The pattern is as follows: the great estates are divided among the landless laborers, and a society of small peasants is set up. In the beginning, this may work fairly well, for the size of the farms is adequate to support a family. However, there is no known method of checking the increase of a peaceable rural population. Since there is little surplus from agriculture, the growth of the cities is stifled, and the growing populations stay behind on the farms. The farms are divided and subdivided until they are too small to support a family, except in extreme poverty."

**The problem
of minifundia**

The Cubans, apparently recognizing these problems, are trying to prevent the development of *minifundia*, excessively small holdings, by setting up farms of about sixty acres. But because of the health revolution, population will double in about twenty-four years. "One can see the small farms becoming *minifundia* in less than fifty years if there is not a large outlet for surplus rural population in industrial cities. . . . Cuba probably has the best chance of any Latin American country (with the possible exception of Brazil and Argentina) of 'making the grade' and moving into an advanced twenty-first century economy. . . . Nevertheless success is not assured; just one mistake too many and Cuba will go the way of Haiti, that little land of utter tragedy.

"The middle-class revolution is a good deal more promising than the agrarian revolution. . . . Its kingpin is an enormous stress on education, especially technical education, and on the development of human resources. Next in importance in this pattern is the development of import-export industries, based fundamentally on some differential advantage of its human resources. . . . There must, of course, be accumulation of physical

capital, and there must, in the long run, be population control. But these things may follow from the development of human resources. . . .

"Where in all this stands communism? In Cuba the question is a real one, for it would seem that the threat of communism is not empty. The answer seems to be that communism is a bigoted and dogmatic version of the middle-class revolution, hampered by an obsolete social science. The success of communism (where it has success) is due to the fact that even the second-rate and the bigoted middle-class revolution is better than none. The chances for success for communism in Cuba, however, strike me as very slight, if only because of its geographical position. If Cuba goes Communist, it will either be occupied or quarantined by the United States. . . . Of the two alternatives, occupation would be a minor-disaster for Cuba; quarantine would be a major disaster. If Cuba were to become an *estado libro asociado* of the United States like Puerto Rico, its economic future would be indeed bright. . . . If, however, Cuba were quarantined like Haiti, it is highly doubtful whether it would be able to develop industry out of its own resources, and fifty years of population increase and subdivision of farms and the absence of any import of organization would soon reduce it to the Haitian level. For the Cubans' own sake, therefore, in view of their geographical position, one hopes that the middle-class revolution will not develop into its East European variant." ("Violence and Revolution," *Liberation*, April 1960)

THE COURSE OF CASTRO'S CUBA

The editors of Visión, largest international Latin American news magazine, assess Fidel Castro and his revolution.

Visión

"The Cuban revolution is not the rootless, hit-or-miss revolution it appears to be. Its precepts were carefully worked out years before there seemed any chance of putting them into effect. They were proclaimed by Castro himself over six years ago . . . and they have subsequently been published in several languages, including English, under the title 'History Will Absolve Me.'" In this, Castro listed six basic problems: land, industrialization, housing, unemployment, education, public health.

"In its sixteen months in office, the revolutionary government has made an impressive start toward solving Fidel Castro's six basic problems. In the process it has eliminated public corruption on almost all levels. And it has gained the respect not only of those whom it professes to help—students, *campesinos* (small farmers) and workers—but also of many whom it hurts . . ."

It has built urban and rural housing, established schools, dug wells, improved health services, and created cooperative farms. "By these and other changes in the lethargic current of Cuban life, Fidel Castro has improved the lot of hundreds of thousands of Cubans. The fact that the beneficiaries belong to Cuba's teeming lower classes is not coincidence. Having helped the masses, Castro can count on their grateful and decisive support. . . ."

"Along with the general rise in the rural standard of living, economic regimentation has become a way of life in Cuba. . . . Nowhere is the planning applied with more zeal than in the field of free enterprise. Obviously this bastion of a private economy must be the first to fall if socialization is to occur. But in Cuba's case, there has been an added fillip: the unusually high level of foreign—and particularly U.S.—participation in the island's business life. . . ."

**Stirring up
the hemisphere**

Predictions

Foreign-owned utilities have been subjected to drastic rate cuts or placed under government control; other foreign enterprises have been subjected to new taxes and regulations. The government has seized or taken control of 45 per cent of Cuba's farmland.

"Land and buildings are not the only things caught in the riptide of change. Cuban labor unions, once among the most independent in Latin America, have been stripped of their most effective weapon: collective bargaining. . . .

"The personal political beliefs of Fidel Castro and his aides are no longer of much consequence in the Cuban scheme of things. What is important is that the policies of the Castro regime are rapidly merging with the goals of the Kremlin and the Popular Socialist party. The tragedy, of course, is that all this need not have happened. Fidel had and has more than enough popular support to stand on his own feet without benefit of Communist braces."

By denouncing the United States, Castro has appealed to latent anti-U.S. sentiment in other Latin American countries. "In turn, he has used the hero-worship this posture has generated among the Latin American masses to publicize the aims and achievements of his revolution. As a result, Castro's popular influence in Latin America has grown to such an extent that it threatens hemispheric solidarity. . . .

"A war psychosis is being deliberately introduced by the government. . . . Castro is mustering public opinion against the first flickerings of hard-core opposition to the regime. . . . The most significant opposition to Castro is developing in the universities, the same centers from which he drew his greatest strength, both in the fight against Batista and the establishment of the revolutionary program. Like most of their Latin American counterparts, the Cuban universities are focal points of leftist thought and, at the same time, bastions of the middle class. Under more normal conditions, this apparent paradox causes little friction. The students, freed from serious financial worries by their parents' pocketbooks, can be as revolutionary in their thinking as they like. But in Cuba, where the very existence of the middle class is being threatened, the situation has become critical. . . .

"Charting the course the Cuban revolution will take over the next few years may be difficult, but a few sound predictions can be sifted from the uncertainties. They are:

"1. Fidel Castro is now totally committed to the creation of a centralized, collectivistic state. . . .

"2. Cuba will orient its commerce more and more toward the Soviet bloc. . . .

"3. Castro's campaign to isolate Latin America from the United States will be stepped up as his propaganda machine develops. At the same time he will stiffen his attacks against governments which do not support his revolution. He can be expected to solicit the support of the Afro-Asian bloc and to bypass the Organization of American States and go directly to the UN, where he can make full use of the support of neutralist nations.

"4. There will be continued efforts to liquidate the Cuban middle class, the group most resistant to the revolution's techniques of brainwashing.

"5. Castro's technique of expropriation without fair compensation, coupled with the spread of *fidélismo* in Latin America, could mean a drop in U.S. and European investments indispensable to Latin American economic development. . . .

"The Kremlin, having been invited into the picture by the Cuban government, is delighted to play up Castro's aims and accomplishments. In doing

so, it embarrasses the United States by invading its sphere of influence and, simultaneously, reminds Washington that Russia has a valuable card to play in future East-West negotiations.

"On the other hand, the Soviets themselves are worried by the breakneck pace of the revolution. Never ones to trust an intractable revolutionary, they feel Castro may go too far and thus produce a violent anti-fidelista and anti-Communist reaction in the hemisphere. Intelligence sources in this country believe that Moscow will withdraw its support of Castro the minute signs of such a reaction appear.

"But whatever the drift of Cuba's relations with the Soviet, U.S. policy-makers are convinced that Castro will remain in control of his revolution. . . . Many feel that if he continues on the present track, he may be able to establish his socialist state—and survive the ensuing economic dislocations.

"The Cuban revolution has opened the eyes of United States authorities to the very real problems facing this country in the hemisphere. More than ever there is an awareness in Washington that this country must establish closer contact with the students, intellectuals and politicians—all those who hold the future of Latin America in their hands. And more than ever there is the realization that the Soviets—and Fidel Castro—are far ahead of us in this respect. Secretary Herter has taken the first major step toward extending long-needed U.S. backing for the popular reforms now taking shape in Latin America. Only a few weeks ago, he spoke out strongly in favor of a credit program to help land distribution in the Americas.

"Nothing would be more welcomed by the governments of Latin America than to have not only the verbal but the physical support of the United States in this matter. For months now, they have suffered Castro's vitriolic attacks in silence. . . .

"United States support of the moderate and progressive forces in Latin America could contribute greatly toward lifting the involuntary veil of silence. With that support, responsible leaders could tell their people the things they now reserve for foreign newsmen. As Venezuela's Romulo Betancourt told one U.S. reporter: 'There is a race here today between evolution and revolution, and the prize is Latin America itself.'

"The race is indeed in full course, and Castro is confident he will win. If he should, it could be the beginning of the end of the institutions upon which representative democracy is based in the hemisphere: the right of a man to own his own land; the privilege of investing in his country's future; and the freedom to choose the manner in which he is to be governed." (*Fidel Castro and the Americas*, May 1960. Available through Readers Service)

ALSO NOTED

R. Hart Phillips

Cuba's educational system is being radically reorganized to instill hero worship of Fidel Castro, hatred of the United States, and a desire for manual labor. Children are taught that José Martí freed Cuba from the Spaniards and Fidel Castro freed it from the United States. They are being given military training from the age of seven. English and music are being eliminated from the curriculum, and the teachers who formerly taught these and other special subjects are being assigned to general lower-grade instruction. Kindergartens are also to be abolished. As far as possible, children over five years old will be housed in large scholastic centers to keep them under the influence of their teachers rather than their families. (*The New York Times*, June 8, 1960)

THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICA

THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM

A Princeton specialist in Islamic culture and literature reports on the struggle for converts in Africa south of the Sahara.

James Kritzeck

"Africa . . . is going steadily, and in some places rapidly, Moslem. The notion that 'Moslem Africa' clings to the southern Mediterranean coast and fades into the sands of the Sahara Desert has been a false one almost from the start; now it is growing falser by the day. Islam . . . has found in the native peoples of tropical Africa its most enthusiastic converts since the Mongols and the Turks. . . . Already one out of every three Africans is a Moslem. . . . It is estimated that for every convert to Christianity in Africa today, there are as many as nine or ten converts to Islam. . . .

"Four major factors help to explain the acceleration. The first of them is the European influence on Africa during the past century, an influence which radically changed the previous tropical African social, political and religious situation. A new type of African civilization, Western (or in this case Northern) 'law and order,' communications, cities and economic enterprises brought about a deterioration of old communal ties and ways.

"The second factor is the traditional behavior of Islam in a minority situation. . . . Islam divides the world into only two parts, the abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the abode of warfare (*dar al-harb*). . . . Officially Islam remains steadfastly inassimilable, and does not normally hesitate in its choice of means to achieve the victory which it regards as inevitable for itself. A third factor is the resurgence of the Moslem states of the northern part of Africa . . . particularly during the past few decades. The fourth, and perhaps most important factor is a composite of . . . circumstances which render Islam attractive to the peoples of tropical Africa today.

"Islam can be presented as an African religion by Africans to Africans. It has no color bar of any kind. . . . It has a one-line creed ('There is no god but God and Mohammed is His messenger') and conversion is painlessly achieved merely by the believing recitation of that formula. . . .

"Islam is resilient, and provides a generous scope for ritualism and 'particularism.' . . . In Africa it seems to permit . . . animistic practices, not excluding 'ju-ju' and black magic. . . . Islam's ethic tolerates and in significant respects accords with that of animist Africa. . . . Since tropical Africa is overwhelmingly polygamous as it is, obviously the Islamic permission of polygamy does not in itself provide an active incentive to conversion; nevertheless the tribal chieftain with a harem of twenty is not likely to be so attracted on this point by, let us say, Christianity. . . .

"From its own tribal origins Islam has been particularly suited and geared to tribes, especially the nomadic. . . . There is hardly one nomadic tribe north of the equator which has not accepted Islam. Islam is also geared, in a more inclusive sense, to the whole African social situation; for both, religion and society are one. Islam thus provides a justification

Islam as an
African religion

**Islam as
anti-Western**

for the African 'feudalism' which Christianity, for instance, almost guarantees to destroy. . . . Conversion to Islam in tropical Africa brings with it an ostentatious feeling of 'belonging' and the possibility of wider communication, better employment, and generally greater social mobility within the relatively higher Islamic segment of African society. . . .

"The European colonial powers, when they entered Africa, engendered in many Africans a feeling of inferiority about their animism. But the religions which these powers brought with them, mainly Catholic and Protestant Christianity . . . became directly and intimately connected in the African mind with the political forces which many Africans were coming, rightly or wrongly, to despise. Likewise, the evident contradiction between the material values which the colonialists worshipped and the spiritual ones which they professed was by no means lost on the Africans.

"Into this vacuum Islam has come in strength, and all the stronger for being untainted by the recent conventional colonialism. . . . At least as important, in recent decades, has been the example and moral support of the newly independent Moslem states in northern Africa. . . .

"Islam has brought many benefits to the Africans whom it has converted. . . . Islam in Africa has also shown a will to dominate, subjugate and dictate. It has been lacking in fully appropriate and appealing social means and goals, notably in the fields of health and education. Above all, it has tended to be anti-white and anti-West. . . .

"Egypt has made a great point of championing the cause of African Islam and of . . . attempting to play a leading role in all anti-European independence efforts in tropical Africa. Morocco has undertaken to play a similar 'protective' role in West Africa. Far more menacing than either . . . is the often-repeated opinion of the Soviet Union that Islam is paving the way for the triumph of universal socialism in tropical Africa. . . . Islam's greatest advantage in tropical Africa has been that so little resistance of any kind has been shown to it. . . . In Ghana a law outlawing political parties on the basis of religion or tribe has curtailed Islam politically and in Tanganyika an economic cooperative system has virtually ended Moslem penetration by traders in one area. But apart from a few such measures and of course the indubitable strength of Christianity in some countries, Islam appears to have a clear field in tropical Africa." ("Islam in Africa," *The Commonwealth*, June 17, 1960)

The foreign affairs columnist of The New York Times also links the reinvigoration of Islam with the expansionist ambitions of Egypt's Nasser.

C. L. Sulzberger

"Centuries have passed since Mohammedanism was synonymous with conquest. . . . In this respect Christianity suffers. Only Seventh Day Adventism and Catholicism seem to be making headway.

"But neither advances so impressively as Islam. Cairo's Moslem theological center has ordered its International Missionary Council to develop an Africa Project. Through both press and radio this emphasizes the anti-racist aspects of the Koran. . . . Following World War I, Cairo and its Al Azhar Seminary assumed Islam's spiritual lead. . . . As Islam expresses itself spiritually through missionaries, it often identifies itself materially with Nasser's pan-African, anti-Western frame of mind. . . .

"In the name of democratic tolerance, we cannot but welcome the successes of a powerful monotheistic dogma. . . . Also in democracy's name, we must guard against the possibility that religion in this instance, as so often in the past, may be misused by some of its proponents for political purposes inimical to our aims." (*The New York Times*, Mar. 26, 1960)

IGNORANCE OF SCIENCE

THE SEVEN FALSE IMAGES

Dr. Holton, a professor of physics at Harvard University and editor in chief of Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, discusses the growing separation between the scientist and the intellectual outside science.

Gerald Holton

"This process is to a large extent merely one aspect of the increasing atomization of loyalties within the intelligentsia. The writer, the scholar, the scientist, the engineer, the teacher, the lawyer, the politician, the physician—each now regards himself first of all as a member of a separate, special group of fellow professionals to which he gives almost all his allegiance and energy; only very rarely does the professional feel a sense of responsibility toward, or of belonging to, a larger intellectual community. This loss of cohesion is perhaps the most relevant symptom of the disease of our culture, for it points directly to one of its specific causes. As in other cases of this sort, this is a failure of image.

"Each person's image of the role of science may differ in detail from that of the next, but all public images are in the main based on one or more of seven positions."

The first sees science either as "pure thought" or as "power," and fails to include its "mythopoeic function," which relates science to intellectual life generally and ultimately to "the tenets and usages of everyday life."

The second regards science as in competition with religion to explain the cosmos. But "to base religious beliefs on an estimate of what science cannot do is as foolish as it is blasphemous. . . .

"The third image of science is that of a force which can invade, possess, pervert, and destroy man. The current stereotype of the soulless, evil scientist is the psychopathic investigator of science fiction or the nuclear destroyer—immoral if he develops the weapons he is asked to produce, traitorous if he refuses. . . . The fear behind this attitude is genuine but not confined to science; it is directed against all thinkers and innovators. Society has always found it hard to deal with creativity, innovation, and new knowledge. And since science assures a particularly rapid, and therefore particularly disturbing, turnover of ideas, it remains a prime target of suspicion."

In the next image, "man cannot be trusted with scientific and technical knowledge" lest he destroy himself. This leads to the notion of a moratorium on science. But the scientist is not a free agent. "Indeed it is erroneous to think of him as advancing toward knowledge; it is, rather, knowledge which advances towards him, grasps him, and overwhelms him."

"The fifth prevalent image of science . . . holds that while neither science nor man may be inherently evil, the rise of science happened, as if by accident, to initiate an ecological change that now corrodes the only conceivable basis for a stable society. In the words of Jacques Maritain, the 'deadly disease' science set off in society is 'the denial of eternal truth and absolute values.' . . .

Sorcerer's
apprentice

"In reality, no field of thought is more conservative than science. Each change necessarily encompasses previous knowledge. Science grows like a tree, ring by ring. Einstein did not prove the work of Newton wrong; he provided a larger setting within which some contradictions and asymmetries in the earlier physics disappeared."

The sixth image of science is "scientism," which induces "the habit of dividing all thought into two categories, up-to-date scientific knowledge and nonsense." To a large degree this sort of thing is unavoidable. One of the reasons for it is the persuasive success of recent technical work.

"The seventh image depicts science as magic, and the scientist as wizard, *deus ex machina*, or oracle. The attitude toward the scientist on this plane ranges from terror to sentimental subservience, depending on what motives one ascribes to him.

"The prevalence of these false images is a main source of the alienation between the scientific and nonscientific elements in our culture, and therefore the failure of image is important business for all of us. Now to pin much of the blame on the insufficient instruction in science which the general student receives at all levels is quite justifiable. I have implied the need, and most people nowadays seem to come to this conclusion anyway. But this is not enough. We must consider the full implications of the discovery that not only the man in the street but almost all of our intellectual leaders today know at most very little about science. And here we come to the central point underlying the analysis made above: the chilling realization that our intellectuals, for the first time in history, are losing their hold of understanding upon the world.

"The wrong images would be impossible were they not anchored in two kinds of ignorance. One kind is ignorance on the basic level, that of *facts*—what biology says about life, what chemistry and physics say about matter, what astronomy says about the development and structure of our galaxy, and so forth. The nonscientist realizes that the old common-sense foundations of thought about the world of nature have become obsolete during the last two generations. The ground is trembling under his feet; the simple interpretations of solidity, permanence, and reality have been washed away, and he is plunged into the nightmarish ocean of four-dimensional continua, probability amplitudes, indeterminacies, and so forth. He knows only two things about the basic conceptions of modern science: that he does not understand them, and that he is now so far separated from them that he will never find out what they mean.

"On the second level of ignorance, the contemporary intellectual knows just as little of the way in which the main facts from the different sciences fit together in a picture of the world taken as a whole. He has had to leave behind him, one by one, those great syntheses which used to represent our intellectual and moral home—the world view of the book of Genesis, of Homer, of Dante, of Milton, of Goethe. In the mid-twentieth century he finds himself abandoned in a universe which is to him an unsolvable puzzle on either the factual or the philosophical level. Of all the bad effects of the separation of culture and scientific knowledge, this feeling of bewilderment and basic homelessness is the most terrifying. Here is the reason, it seems to me, for the ineffectiveness and self-denigration of our contemporary intellectuals. Nor are the scientists themselves protected from this fate, for it has always been, and must always be, the job of the humanist to construct and disseminate the meaningful total picture of the world." ("Modern Science and the Intellectual Tradition," *Science*, Apr. 22, 1960. Available through Readers Service)

HOMES TO LIVE IN

HOW TO USE GOVERNMENT AID

In the past decade, almost half of all new non-farm houses received direct federal aid, and indirect aid went to many more. Federal agencies guarantee more than \$100 billion in mortgages. Mr. Abrams, former New York State Rent Administrator and one of the architects of federal housing policies, examines the results to date and finds little cause for smugness.

Charles S. Abrams

"I do not mean to underestimate the gains made as a result of federal aid. Homeowners have gained from low down payments and longer term financing; slum clearance in areas where there were vacancies has improved housing standards; colleges, veterans, and a small proportion of the elderly have benefited; savings and loan associations have profited from federal aid; and builders have been encouraged to produce larger and better-planned suburban developments.

"Yet, with all these achievements, and with the host of federal agencies operating in the many aspects of housing, the failures of the federal effort stand out more dramatically than its accomplishments."

New housing has been provided mainly for those with incomes above \$6,000, although median family income in 1957 was \$4,350. The lowest income group has been virtually unprovided for. The slum problem is almost untouched. Minority groups have been victimized rather than helped. Low-income home ownership has been ignored. The housing shortage continues to get worse.

"Though the housing program is looked to as one of the main levers for reconverting to a normal economy in the event of disarmament, the building industry, under current programs, is not equipped to take up any part of the slack caused by such reconversion. . . . The land problem and failure of regional rationalization in our cities is holding back planned development and logical urban expansion. There is no federal or state planning law or any housing law or policy that is functioning to enable rational regional growth and development. Suburban enclaves are continuing to circumscribe the older city, a good part of urban services are being wasted, the urban tax load is being increased and the urban economies are being seriously affected.

"One reason for the inadequacy of residential building has been our failure to revitalize our housing program to fit new facts, needs and conditions. Take the public housing program. It was ushered in on the following misassumptions:

"*Fiction 1. The poor live only in tenements.* This was part of a philosophy borrowed from England, which assumed that the poor do not want individual homes but prefer to raise their children only in multiple dwellings. It has resulted in the building of projects of minimum standard, many of them with an institutional appearance, that are hardly a credit to what should represent the American standard of life.

"*Fiction 2. The poor are all renters.* This fiction survives in housing

No planning
policy

Some slums
can be saved

Plan for lower
mortgage costs

policy although the strongest yearning of the poorer families is for homes they can own and in which they can raise their children decently." Homes for rental are essential, but homes for ownership should also be available.

"Fiction 3. The way to solve the housing problem of low-income families is to tear down the slums in which they live. This was a valid theory in the depression years when slum housing was often 25 per cent vacant and when wholesale demolitions did not produce mass homelessness. But when housing surplus turns into housing famine, the most devastating visitation is mass eviction. In such a case slum clearance should be held down and the emphasis of housing programs for the underprivileged should be placed upon . . . building more new homes on vacant and underdeveloped sites—both for rental and for ownership.

"Fiction 4. A slum is a physically unfit building, old, dilapidated, or sub-standard. This fiction, incorporated into federal legislation, has become responsible for aggravating the housing conditions of low-income families. While it is true that many slum buildings deserve to be torn down, it is overcrowding rather than physical deterioration that has become the worst aspect of slum life today. Demolition only intensifies overcrowding. . . .

"Fiction 5. When tenants in public housing improve their incomes, they should be ousted. This fiction has been responsible for the forcible return of families to slums instead of enabling them to rent or buy homes they can afford. It has given public housing an institutional aspect. And since minority families usually have the lowest incomes, public housing projects in the larger cities have become increasingly occupied by them, accentuating segregation in neighborhood composition and in schools.

"Fiction 6. The city planning and housing problems can be solved by cities alone. The whole concept of housing has been predicated from the start on the premise that local housing authorities and local planning commissions can grapple with a problem which is national or at least regional in scope.

"It is manifest that a completely new approach to housing is essential. A new program is needed to provide home ownership for all families who cannot afford new housing at present prices and terms. . . .

"Mortgage charges constitute more than 52 per cent of the gross carrying charges of a home. Every interest reduction of 1 per cent on a twenty-five-year \$14,000 mortgage (90 per cent of cost) reduces mortgage charges by about \$100 annually. An extension of the mortgage from twenty-five to thirty-five years means a reduction of another \$140. Elimination of the .5 per cent premium charge would reduce it another \$50. Add it all up and the savings annually would be \$290. Building costs would have to be cut by \$4,000 to effect a similar saving. . . . The housing problem is soluble through a home ownership program if interest and amortization rates are pared, and with a subsidy equal to local taxes, families now eligible only for the limited quantity of public housing could acquire home ownership. . . .

"Most housing programs today are being built for the so-called 'average' family, which is composed of two or three children and a husband and wife. But there are also the non-average families, for whom housing is rarely provided—the aged person living alone, the aged couple, males living alone, females living alone, . . . transients, minorities for whom no housing is available, working mothers who must live in the city. In fact, if we were to add the total number of non-average families we would find that they exceed the number of average families. . . .

"Federal housing policy has reached a dead end and it is impossible for the present to move it forward or alter it substantially. It is anchored by

**Developing
vacant land**

its vested interests and its vested illusions. . . . Over the last twenty-five years, Congress has been sold certain slogans and certain formulae; nobody is challenging them effectively, and to change them would stir up opposition from banks and builders, raise issues like the race problem, the urban and suburban conflict, etc. What is, must continue to be. Perhaps if housing can be made an important issue in the ensuing election and the defects of the present program dramatized, some headway can be made. In the meantime, no progress can be made unless the states and cities rise to the occasion. . . .

"The land problem in cities continues troublesome everywhere. It will grow worse as the population grows. Unless it is resolved no amount of expenditure will resolve the housing dilemma. The problem is not one of land shortage—the whole population of the United States can be housed at twelve families to the acre on the coast of California with every family having a view of the Pacific. There is the appearance of shortage because everybody is competing for the flat land within the city orbit—subdividers, farmers, universities, factories, airports, cemeteries. . . .

"State land-acquisition agencies should be organized for the main function of acquiring vacant land outside city boundaries. The state agency should have power to acquire large areas, improve them with streets and utilities, and resell them for private and public development according to a prearranged plan. Land essential for schools, parks and other public uses would be reserved. The state and federal governments should contribute the essential subsidies for acquisition and improvement, and the land released for private development would be resold at market value or less for social purposes.

"Our federal urban renewal program needs substantial modification. Its aims should be to: 1) Increase the housing supply (as promised in the preamble of the law) instead of contracting the supply for those whom it displaces and who are the least able to secure alternative shelter; 2) Provide for state or regional redevelopment through state or regional agencies instead of through our landlocked cities; 3) Identify existing community values where they exist and build upon them instead of destroying them.

"A program of land reserves and imaginative urban renewal could produce a British-type 'new towns' movement in the United States. It would insure better use of the thousands of square miles now scheduled for haphazard development.

**What do
we want?**

"While cities are as old as civilization, the metropolitan complex is only a recent phenomenon. In such areas in America, as indeed in the rest of the world, the bulk of future populations will dwell. In these metropolitan complexes, most of the world's production and consumption will take place, yet no one has yet tackled the question of what kind of cities we want in this growing metropolitan complex. Do we want a series of landlocked cities punctuated at their peripheries by Levittowns? Do we want 'project cities,' composed of impersonal, air-conditioned efficiency units for the better-heeled while subsidized subsistence inefficiency units are reserved for the clodhoppers? Shall our cities be for the blacks and our suburbs for the whites, or shall the blacks be constantly 'renewed' to make way for those whites who drift back to the cities when suburban housing becomes too troublesome? Or, having exhausted the horizontal frontier as far as the suburbs will let us, shall we now pierce the vertical frontier once reserved exclusively for prayer until our cities have become forests of steel, stone and shadow?" (Address at the Governors' Conference on Housing, Los Angeles, June 13, 1960. Available through Readers Service)

THE IMPACT OF MASS CULTURE

SOCIETY: MASS AND REFINED

*The author of *Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt is on the staff of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J. She finds culture threatened by "refined society" as well as by "mass society," but in different ways.*

Hannah Arendt

"Generally speaking, I think it has been the great good fortune of this country to have [the] intermediary stage of good and cultured society play a relatively minor role in its development; but the disadvantage of this good fortune today is that those few who will still make a stand against mass culture as an unavoidable consequence of mass society are tempted to look upon these earlier phenomena of society and culture as a kind of golden age and lost paradise, precisely because they know so little of it. America has been only too well acquainted with the barbarian philistinism of the *nouveau riche*, but it has only a nodding acquaintance with the equally annoying cultural and educated philistinism of a society where culture actually has 'snob-value,' and where it is a matter of status to be educated....

"It is still an open question whether it is more difficult to discover the great authors of the past without the help of any tradition than it is to rescue them from the rubbish of educated philistinism. And this task of preserving the past without the help of tradition, and often even against traditional standards and interpretations, is the same for the whole of Western civilization. Intellectually, though not socially, America and Europe are in the same situation: the thread of tradition is broken, and we must discover the past for ourselves—that is, read its authors as though nobody had ever read them before. In this task, mass society is much less in our way than good and educated society. . . .

"It would be unfortunate indeed if out of the dilemmas and distractions of mass culture and mass society there should arise an altogether unwarranted and idle yearning for a state of affairs which is not better but only a bit more old-fashioned. And the eager and uncritical acceptance of such obviously snobbish and philistine terms as highbrow, middlebrow, and lowbrow is a rather ominous sign. For the only nonsocial and authentic criterion for works of culture is, of course, their relative permanence and even their ultimate immortality. The point of the matter is that as soon as the immortal works of the past became the object of 'refinement' and acquired the status which went with it, they lost their most important and elemental quality, which is to grasp and move the reader or spectator throughout the centuries. . . . The astounding recovery of the creative arts in the twentieth century, and a less apparent but perhaps no less real recovery of the greatness of the past, began when good society lost its monopolizing grip on culture, together with its dominant position in society as a whole. . . .

"Perhaps the chief difference between society and mass society is that society wanted culture, evaluated and devaluated cultural things into social commodities [which could be circulated and cashed in on as social coinage

The "brows"
are ominous

**Entertainment
is necessary**

for the purpose of acquiring social status], used and abused them for its own selfish purposes, but did not 'consume' them. Even in their most worn-out shapes, these things remained things, they were not 'consumed' and swallowed up but retained their worldly objectivity. Mass society, on the contrary, wants not culture but entertainment, and the wares offered by the entertainment industry are indeed consumed by society just as are any other consumer goods. . . .

"*Panis et circenses* truly belong together; both are necessary for life, for its preservation and recuperation, and both vanish in the course of the life process—that is, both must constantly be produced anew and offered anew, lest this process cease entirely. The standards by which both should be judged are indeed freshness and novelty—standards by which we today (and, I think, quite mistakenly) judge cultural and artistic objects as well, things which are supposed to remain in the world even after we have left it. . . .

"It has always been the mark of educated philistinism to despise entertainment and amusement because no 'value' could be derived from them. In so far as we are all subject to life's great cycle, we all stand in need of entertainment and amusement in some form or other, and it is sheer hypocrisy or social snobbery to deny that we can be amused and entertained by exactly the same things which amuse and entertain the masses of our fellow men. As far as the survival of culture is concerned, it certainly is less threatened by those who fill vacant time with amusement and entertainment than by those who fill it with some haphazard educational gadget in order to improve their social standing. . . .

"It is as though the futility inherent in entertainment had been permitted to permeate the whole social atmosphere, and the often described malaise of the artists and intellectuals is of course partly due to their inability to make themselves heard and seen in the tumultuous uproar of mass society, or to penetrate its noisy futility. But this protest of the artist against society is as old as society, though not older; the great revival of nearly all the arts in our century (which perhaps one day will seem one of the great artistic—and of course scientific—periods of Western civilization) began with the malaise of the artist in society, with his decision to turn his back upon it and its 'values,' to leave the dead to bury the dead. As far as artistic productivity is concerned, it should not be more difficult to withstand the massive temptation of mass culture, or to keep from being thrown out of gear by the noise and humbug of mass society, than it was to avoid the more sophisticated temptations and the more insidious noises of the cultural snobs in refined society.

**Ransacking
the past**

"Unhappily, the case is not that simple. The entertainment industry is confronted with gargantuan appetites, and since its wares disappear in consumption, it must constantly offer new commodities. In this predicament, those who produce for the mass media ransack the entire range of past and present culture in the hope of finding suitable material. This material, however, cannot be offered as it is; it must be prepared and altered in order to become entertaining; it cannot be consumed as it is.

"Mass culture comes into being when mass society seizes upon cultural objects, and its danger is that the life process of society (which like all biological processes insatiably draws everything available into the cycle of its metabolism) will literally consume the cultural objects, eat them up and destroy them. I am not referring to the phenomenon of mass distribution. When cultural objects, books, or pictures in reproduction, are thrown on the market cheaply and attain huge sales, this does not affect the nature of the

Making culture
entertaining

goods in question. But their nature is affected when these objects themselves are changed (rewritten, condensed, digested, reduced to *Kitsch* in the course of reproduction or preparation for the movies) in order to be put into usable form for a mass sale which they otherwise could not attain. . . .

"This state of affairs, which indeed is equaled nowhere else in the world, can properly be called mass culture; its promoters are neither the masses nor their entertainers, but are those who try to entertain the masses with what once was an authentic object of culture, or to persuade them that *Hamlet* can be as entertaining as *My Fair Lady*, and educational as well. The danger of mass education is precisely that it may become very entertaining indeed; there are many great authors of the past who have survived centuries of oblivion and neglect, but it is still an open question whether they will be able to survive an entertaining version of what they have to say. . . .

"The devaluation of culture in good society through the cultural philistines was the characteristic peril of commercial society, whose primary public area was the exchange market for goods and ideas. The disappearance of culture in a mass society, on the other hand, comes about when we have a consumers' society which . . . does not know how to take care of the world and the things which belong to it: the society's own chief attitude toward objects, the attitude of consumption, spells ruin to everything it touches. If we understand by culture what it originally meant (the Roman *cultura*—derived from *colere*, to take care of and preserve and cultivate) then we can say without any exaggeration that a society obsessed with consumption cannot at the same time be cultured or produce a culture. . . .

Culture is
not functional

"An object is cultural to the extent that it can endure; this durability is the very opposite of its functionality, which is the quality which makes it disappear again from the phenomenal world by being used and used up. The 'thingness' of an object appears in its shape and appearance, the proper criterion of which is beauty. If we wanted to judge an object by its use value alone, and not also by its appearance (that is, by whether it is beautiful or ugly or something in between), we would first have to pluck out our eyes. Thus, the functionalization of the world which occurs in both society and mass society deprives the world of culture as well as beauty. Culture can be safe only with those who love the world for its own sake, who know that without the beauty of man-made, worldly things which we call works of art, without the radiant glory in which potential imperishability is made manifest to the world and in the world, all human life would be futile and no greatness could endure." ("Society and Culture," *Daedalus*, Spring 1960)

BUILT-IN IDIOSYNCRASY

An English author (The Uses of Literacy) and lecturer at the University of Leicester identifies "the processing of experience" as the distinctive product of mass communications.

Richard Hoggart

"We are seeing more and more, and in increasingly subtle ways, a public processing of experience (and this, unless it is totally inefficient, can't fail to have some private effect). I think this processing is a threat to freedom no less dangerous—though less evident—than those we are used to talking about. Its intangibility is part of its strength. It can allow an apparent freedom, and indeed variety; yet both have lost their nature. It recalls . . . Dostoevsky's chapter on The Grand Inquisitor [in *The Brothers Karamazov*]:

"Too damned
nice"

Everything
in its place

"'Yes, we shall set them to work, but in their leisure hours we shall make their life like a child's game. . . . Oh, we shall allow them even sin, because they are weak and helpless, and they will love us like children because we allow them to sin. We shall tell them that every sin will be expiated, if it is done with our permission, that we allow them to sin because we love them . . . and they will have no secrets from us. . . . The most powerful secrets of their conscience, all they will bring to us, and we shall have an answer for all. And they will be glad to believe our answer, for it will save them from the great anxiety and terrible agony they endure at present in making a free decision for themselves.' . . .

"The danger . . . is not that mass culture will be crude and raucous, full of sex and violence. These elements can certainly be seen but they are essentially marginal and should be regarded as reactions, warning mechanisms or even sometimes as a healthy kicking-back against the main trend. The real danger is that a successful mass culture will be too damned nice, a bland muted processed institutionalized decency, a suburban or commuter's limbo in which nothing real ever happens and the gut has gone out of life as it is reflected and encouraged by all public media. This is true of the trend not only of cautious public-service communications but also of the commercial media. The trouble with commercial television in Britain is not, as some of us expected, that it is sexy and bold—but that it is altogether too homey, gregarious and euphoric.

"Nor will mass culture be ostensibly anti-intellectual or anti-art. It thrives on the simulation of the process of democratic enquiry. Its spirit is as much at home in most 'serious' political discussions on television as in the most plainly inane quiz show. It likes writers and artists—where it can present them or their work as permissibly odd or idiosyncratic. But it helps to make the understanding of radical enquiry or artistic exploration more difficult precisely because it sets up a simulacrum of debate, enquiry and exploration. For public consumption the channels of radical enquiry have been narrowed, straightened, tidied and set in shallow concrete beds.

"Art—culture—intellectual affairs—education: these will not seem to be neglected in a mass society. We do wrong to imagine a society of 'low-brows' all glued to television. Art, culture and the rest will have their place—as marks of differentiation; and so they will be processed. . . . The mass society has room, along with the 'lowbrow' papers and the giveaway shows, for the literary pages in *Vogue* and the paper 'only top people read.' . . . [But] this process only admits of certain fairly predictable variations—and so ceases to have the virtue of genuine variation. The real heart goes from it. . . . Ostensible stratification by depth of brow is no more than a *social* distinguishing mark and artistically [the newly emerging cultural productions] all belong to the same processed and lifeless area. . . .

"Mass communications assist this processing by the very nature of their relationship to their audience or audiences. In the beginning, their audiences are comparatively undifferentiated, undifferentiated by social class, geography, background, professional experience. Whoever is within range and wishes to switch on is the audience . . . and this not only makes for difficulties of tone but presses towards the creation of a 'dream-world,' a context or environment which will annoy less and please more people than any other. . . .

"But . . . mass society will promote new cultural stratifications. Surely then the audiences will eventually cease, or cease for some of the time, to be quite undifferentiated? This is true. The trouble then is that those audiences

The cardboard
audience

are in a certain sense *unknown*. They are not Fielding's audience or Jane Austen's audience or even T. S. Eliot's audience or Franz Kafka's audience: they are junior executives wanting a cultural finish, established men from the managerial group wanting to 'keep up' and so on. I don't mean to scoff at any of the human beings behind these categories. My concern is that the human beings are sold such substitute tack. . . . They are seen only as parts of people, or people seen partially; they are rarely seen in anything approaching a full setting, three dimensionally—or what passes for that is a cardboard construction. They are seen preeminently in relation to function, profession, expectation. . . .

"In working for mass communications we are under sustained pressure to keep our eye on the audience, not on the object. Even the most thoughtful or austere public-service broadcasting producer will find himself judging a character for, say, a political discussion program by his immediate attractiveness—or by whether his unattractiveness falls within the permissibly idiosyncratic limits (again, the built-in variation) rather than by *what* he contributes. This is the new, mid-twentieth-century aestheticism. It substitutes, to borrow a phrase from an American Jesuit, virtuosity for virtue. . . .

"Behind all I have been saying is the assumption that in our societies class-and-culture have been immensely intertwined, in part disabingly but also in part fruitfully; that these particular forms of entwinement are now being loosened and that many people are—unconsciously but intensely—trying to find new links, and that the links which are most often promoted in present circumstances are those between culture-and-status-and-commodities. It would be idle and wrong to regret the breaking of many of the old links. None of us can produce a blueprint for a 'decently classless society.' But we can reasonably and pragmatically work in the direction of a society which recognizes variety, distinctions, differences and doesn't narrowly relate them to birth-marks, 'prestige-culture' marks or consumption marks." ("The Quality of Cultural Life in Mass Society," Address, General Conference, Congress for Cultural Freedom, Berlin, June 1960)

UNDIFFERENTIATED IRRELEVANCE

A professor of American history at Harvard University finds little similarity between the culture communicated by mass media and the popular culture of the past.

Oscar Handlin

"By 1900 almost everywhere in the Western world the term 'culture' had acquired a distinctive connotation, just as the term 'society' had. 'Society' no longer referred to the total order of the populace in a community, but only to a small self-defined segment of it. And 'culture' no longer referred to the total complex of forms through which the community satisfied its wants, but only to certain narrowly defined modes of expression distinguished largely by their lack of practicality." Unlike the defined culture, popular culture "retained a functional quality in the sense that it was closely related to the felt needs and familiar modes of expression of the people it served. Popular songs were to be danced to, vaudeville to be laughed at, and embroidery to be worn or to cover a table."

Because popular culture lacked canons, classics, or a history, the misconception has arisen "that the 'mass culture' of the present is but an extension of the popular culture of the past. . . . [But] the Ed Sullivan show is not vaudeville in another guise any more than *Omnibus* is a modernized Chautauqua. Television, the movies, and the mass-circulation magazines

An audience
aroused

stand altogether apart from the older vehicles of both popular and defined culture. . . . Popular culture, although unstructured and chaotic, dealt directly with the concrete world intensely familiar to its audience. . . . A continuing relevance . . . was maintained by a direct rapport between those who created and those who consumed this culture. . . . The writers and actors sprang from the identical milieu as their audience did, and maintained a firm sense of identification with it. . . .

"Finally, popular culture had the capacity for arousing in its audience such sentiments as wonder and awe, and for expressing the sense of irony of their own situation which lent it enormous emotional power. Men and women shed real tears or rocked with laughter in the playhouses of the Bowery, as they could not in the opera or the theatre uptown. . . .

"Out of American popular culture there emerged occasional bursts of creativity of high level" such as Charlie Chaplin and early jazz, but it "was not justified by such by-products so much as by the function it served. Millions of people found in this culture a means of communication among themselves and the answers to certain significant questions that they were asking about the world around them. Indeed, it was the perception of this function that attracted the avant-garde in the opening decades of the twentieth century. . . . In fact some of the Bohemians were inclined to idealize popular culture in revulsion against the inability of the official culture to satisfy their own needs.

"In the light of these considerations, it is possible to begin to assess the effects of the mass media on the character of popular culture. . . .

"The critics of the mass media are in error when they condemn its products out of hand. These media can tolerate good as well as bad contents, high as well as low art. Euripides and Shakespeare can perfectly well follow the Western or quiz show on TV, and the slick magazine can easily sandwich in cathedrals and madonnas among the pictures of athletes and movie queens.

"What is significant, however, is that it does not matter. The mass media find space for politics and sports, for science and fiction, for art and music, all presented on an identical plateau of irrelevance. And the audience which receives this complex variety of wares accepts them passively as an undifferentiated but recognizable series of good things among which it has little capacity for choice, and with which it cannot establish any meaningful, direct relationship.

An audience
sold

"The way in which the contents of the mass media are communicated deprives the audience of any degree of selectivity, for those contents are marketed as any other commodities are. In our society it seems possible through the use of the proper marketing device to sell anybody anything, so that what is sold has very little relevance to the character of either the buyers or of the article sold. . . .

"The mass media have also diluted, if they have not altogether destroyed, the rapport that formerly existed between the creators of popular culture and its consumers. In this respect, the television playlet or variety performance is far different from the vaudeville turn, which is its lineal antecedent. The performer can no longer sense the mood of his audience and is, in any case, bound by the rigidity of his impersonal medium. The detachment in which he and they operate makes communication between them hazy and fragmentary. As a result, the culture communicated by the mass media cannot serve the function in the lives of those who consume it that the popular culture of the past did." ("Comments on Mass and Popular Culture," *Daedalus*, Spring 1960)

THE MASS MEDIA

REPORTING WORLD AFFAIRS

A correspondent and publicist finds that U.S. newspapers, "with a few honorable exceptions," do not tell their readers what they need to know about the world.

Arnold Beichman

"It is no 'conspiracy' that keeps foreign news out of our papers. But the fact is that there are perhaps only a half-dozen American newspapers which have their own permanent overseas news bureaus. Those of us who live in large cities take it for granted that maintenance of its own overseas news service is a common thing for any sizable newspaper. On the contrary, it is a rare thing. But some of the large competent newspapers with foreign news services do sell their newsfile to all comers; therefore, where a local newspaper fails to give readers this coverage, something other than inability to supply its own foreign correspondence is involved. As it is, most foreign news in these local dailies comes from the Associated Press and United Press International. . . .

"What is not generally realized is that many correspondents for these large news agencies not only lack knowledge of the language and culture of the countries they are covering, but, even more unhappily, seem as deficient in political understanding as they are in intellectual curiosity. . . .

"To a large extent the reason the newspaper business is so full of mediocrities is because the best of our reporters and editors are going to more lucrative and perhaps even more satisfying areas of the communication industries. . . .

**Newsman
as salesman**

"Worst of all, a news agency bureau chief is likely to be a salesman. He is probably half a working correspondent. His job is to sell the news and photo service to the newspapers of the country or area to which he is assigned. . . .

"A bureau chief who affronts a customer—it could even be some Communist daily—with an unflattering news story may lose that customer to another news service. The real victim is likely to be the reader whose newspaper depends for its foreign news coverage upon a news agency whose correspondents are salesmen. . . .

"Not all foreign news lends itself to simple writing; much of it is dull by any standard and fantastically complicated . . . even, in an immediate sense, inconsequential. And so much foreign news, even when it is presumably easy to understand, is contradictory. . . .

"That in this jungle only our best newspapers can even begin to do a proper job of public instruction is understandable. And that the average newspaper should bog down before the vast demands made on it by present world affairs is also understandable. What is grievous is that so little effort is made to mitigate a difficult situation. In the average American newspaper there is no continuity in publishing a running foreign story. A report from London may appear on a Monday, drop out of sight on Tuesday and Wednesday for lack of space (although the news agencies are still dutifully reporting), reappear on Thursday, but by now be a mystery since what

went on in the interim was never published. The result is not unlike a badly cut movie re-cut to fit the exigencies of the television late-show commercials.

"That is why the publishers' alibi, based on tendentious surveys, is unacceptable: that the reader just 'isn't interested' in foreign news. I have read enough newspapers west of the Hudson to say: neither *am I* interested in what passes for foreign news in the average newspaper. Foreign news is normally treated as filler to surround department-store advertising. . . .

"If publishers want foreign news by their own correspondents, they can have it economically. All their moaning about costly cable and telephone tolls is nonsense: with the arrival of the jet and an invention known as air-express, it is no feat to send fresh copy overnight from Europe. Three or four newspapers can easily pool enough money to hire a capable correspondent for overseas assignment to do thoughtful, interpretive stories and the only transmission costs will be in airmail postage stamps. News agencies can do the expensive cabling and phoning necessary to reporting specific events." ("America's Irrelevant Newspapers," *Columbia University Forum*, Spring 1960)

The American correspondent of The Guardian (Manchester) offers an explanation for the slighting of foreign news by most of the U.S. press.

Alistair Cooke

"It is, I suppose, inevitable that in a far-flung federal republic whose states are responsible for so much of their own affairs . . . the newspapers are compelled for their own survival to stay in the main with the local problems of the community they serve and with the particular crop or industry by which its citizens live." ("World News Is No News," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Apr. 28, 1960)

CORRESPONDENTS BEHIND THE CURTAIN

The accuracy of Mr. Rosenthal's 1959 reports to The New York Times on political developments in Warsaw was acknowledged in an order expelling him from Poland and later in a Pulitzer Prize award.

A. M. Rosenthal

"The realization comes slowly to a Western newspaperman working in a Communist satellite that he is not only writing about the people of Eastern Europe but for them. It is not a particularly happy or comfortable thought, but there is no getting around it. It is part of the changing role of the foreign correspondent, even though he didn't ask for it.

"There is no great political mystery involved, and no political motivation on the reporter's part. It all happens quite simply, and quite inevitably.

"In every Communist satellite, the domestic press is heavily censored. Sometimes the government encourages a bit of criticism on domestic issues—'Why aren't we getting more cloth out of that factory in Lodz?'—and sometimes a brave local newspaperman can slip in an innuendo that he may live to regret.

"But nothing important is ever printed in a newspaper in Eastern Europe that is not government-approved. Much more to the point is the fact that everyday news important to the nation is not printed at all. Eastern Europeans become quite adept at interpreting and reading the real meaning into what is printed. But it is a jigsaw puzzle kind of game, with key pieces left out, and everybody knows it.

"In every Communist satellite there are a few men who can write the truth as they see it and find it, write as they please. These are the foreign

**Correspondents
can be useful**

correspondents. It makes them, and their jobs, much more important than they had realized. And it makes them dangerous to the governments.

"There is no censorship for foreign correspondents in any Communist satellite. Naturally, there are plenty of hidden censorships: The call to the Foreign Office for a dressing-down, the frightening away of friends, the closing up of sources, the threat of ouster, the withholding of visas, and, finally, the bounce.

"But the fact still remains that as long as he is in the Eastern European nation, any foreign correspondent can write without a word being taken out of his story before it reaches his office. What's more, with the passport in his pocket as the substitute for real courage, he can go after a story, ask questions, reject answers, and ask more. There are not many men in any Communist country who can do that, not many at all.

"The Communist governments allow the foreign correspondent to be censorship-free because this is part of the pleasant image of liberalization; and also because they know they can quite often influence or control him without the fuss and nastiness of imposing censorship.

"The Communist governments detest most foreign correspondents, but they want them around anyway—most of the time. They feel a corps of foreign correspondents adds a certain importance to a capital. They know that times come when the Communists themselves will want their stories—stories of progress, or perhaps of pressure from Moscow—printed abroad.

"These governments pay a price for having foreign correspondents around—and sometimes they decide the price is just too high. The correspondent may be getting a little too inquisitive, a little too unheeding of pressures.

"And sometimes there is a domestic crisis. The whole nation knows about the crisis in general terms but their papers give no real information. The foreign correspondent gets hold of a good deal more of the story. He writes it, and within hours the whole domestic censorship apparatus is destroyed by the broadcasts coming back. Somebody in the party picks up the phone, the Foreign Office gets its instructions, the correspondent is asked to drop around, right away, and the Official Spokesman tells him:

"'A pleasant morning, but I'm afraid I have some unpleasant news for you.'" ("Jigsaw Game," *Dateline* 1960)

ALSO NOTED

Business Week

The Gillette Safety Razor Company had a problem which started when it developed a new blade that was everything that it had been saying about its old product over the years.

"In the words of Vincent C. Ziegler, president of the Gillette division: 'Over the years the language has been so beggared by extravagance that superlatives have lost their impact. We ourselves have not been overly modest in advertising our Blue Blades. Now we had a radical improvement. What do we do?'

"Another Gillette executive put it this way: 'Our problem was to figure out a way of telling customers, 'You've got to believe us, fellows. This time we really mean it.'"

"The upshot is the series of relatively quiet ads that try to sell the new Super Blue Blades in simple, black-and-white text without slogans, pictures, or the usual hyperbole. The theory is simple: If the public has been deafened and its credulity jaded by strident and almost hysterical claims, then perhaps the best way to get attention is to whisper." (*Business Week*, May 14, 1960)

MISCELLANY

SEX AND FREEDOM

Mr. Lacy is managing director of the American Book Publishers Council, and a board member of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Dan Lacy

"For the first time in its history the Supreme Court has undertaken to clarify the confused state of the law regarding obscenity." The principal effect "has been to affirm that obscene films and publications do not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment and to define obscene films and publications as those that, in the absence of any redeeming social value, have as their dominant theme an appeal to the prurient interest of the normal reader, and that exceed the bounds of frankness tolerated in the community.

"The courts have made it plain that police and prosecutors may not avoid recourse to the courts by making up lists of publications ordering or suggesting that they not be sold; that the actual or alleged effect of publications on minors may not be used to ban their sale to adults; that a publication cannot be judged on the basis of excerpts; that a film or publication can lose its constitutional protection only if it is actually obscene, and not by being held 'immoral' or 'sacrilegious'; and that there must be evidence that a bookseller has some knowledge of the content of a publication in order to convict him for its sale as an obscene item. . . . But the court rulings in no way limit the power of federal, state or local governments to punish the real pornographer. . . .

**Pornography
is punishable**

"Many publications which earnest and sincerely concerned men and women may believe to be objectionable will nevertheless be ruled not obscene by the courts. Troubling as this fact may be to those who have objected, it would be far more troubling for society as a whole if the powers of a state were so sweeping and so sweepingly enforced that nothing could be published to which a substantial number of people objected. The state can endeavor to prevent or punish crime; it cannot successfully regulate morality. . . .

"Because the law is unwilling to extend its force so far as many would like to see it go, there is a strong temptation for the indignant to take the law into their own hands and use means of compulsion outside the courts." Their illegal or extra-legal methods "are not only offensive in principle to our sense of the indispensable role of the due process of law in protecting all our liberties; they quickly run beyond the suppression of obscenity to the censorship of writings of serious purpose. When not held in check by the necessity of proving a case before a disinterested court, the solicitude of those who would protect our morals extends itself insensibly to our minds as well. . . .

"There is certainly no reason why the opinions of any group about any kind of publication or any particular book, or about the general level of literature, should not be as forcefully and widely expressed as the group may wish; and such an expression will not be without its effect. There is certainly no reason why any group should not undertake to persuade its

own members, and any others whom it can influence, not to read books it thinks will harm them. One can, of course, control his own reading and control or influence that of his children.

"But one can go further. Most committees and organizations set up to deal with obscenity and related problems have 'for decent literature' in their titles, but few do anything positive to bring good reading to the children and youth that most need it. By efforts to see that our children come to know the best of reading and by supporting better school libraries and public library service to children and youths we will do far more to make reading an uplifting and enriching experience than by any number of sporadic committee complaints about newsstands." ("Obscenity and Censorship," *The Christian Century*, May 4, 1960)

A former editor of Encounter and The Reporter deplores the current lack of any authorities competent to define and defend decency.

"It is impossible genuinely to mourn the passing of the Mandarins and Brahmins of the older 'highbrow' elite. . . . Their notion of defending standards came to mean, in practice, a vigilant hostility to creative talent, as against mere mimicry. Above all, they seemed unaware of the fact that young people needed something more in life than the benevolent assurance that they would soon be middle-aged.

"But now that they are gone, who is to do their job? *Someone* has to be able to say, with assurance and a measure of authority, what is culture and what is not, what is decent and what is not. There must be some group or class that is admittedly competent to decide—not without error, but more wisely than anyone else—questions of moral and cultural value. Otherwise, a necessary and vital element of order in the life of a society will be lacking. . . .

"Most members of the educated class in America will concede that pornography ought to be the object of legal sanctions. But these same people have never defined what pornography is. . . . And, indeed, anyone who displays a genuine concern for the issue is regarded suspiciously as an enemy of art, an enemy of promise, an enemy of the free in spirit.

"Instead of facing up to the issue, an elaborate ideology of evasion has been constructed. . . . We do not know what pornography is, because standards of propriety and decency are always changing. We do not know what the effects of pornography are upon the consumer; it is always possible that, by the vicarious discharge of sadistic aggressions, an individual's mental health may be, if not improved, then at least maintained in equilibrium. . . . We do not know—oh, there is so much we do not know! . . .

"No one can deny that all these arguments from ignorance have an element of truth in them. The only thing wrong with them is that they are impossible to live by. . . . That we can never be sure of the difference between right and wrong, good and evil . . . is not the same thing as saying there is *no* difference. . . .

"In the United States, the American Civil Liberties Union is always appearing in court to defend [its ideas of literary freedom]. . . . The net result is that the laws against pornography in the United States are enforced in an utterly capricious manner. Edmund Wilson's *Memoirs of Hecate County* is banned in New York State; *Playboy* circulates freely. This is what is bound to happen when the definition of 'literature' is something that literary men, as a matter of aesthetic and political principle, refuse to essay." ("High, Low, and Modern," Address, General Conference, Congress for Cultural Freedom, Berlin, June 1960)

WHO SHOULD SUBSIDIZE THE THEATRE?

The retired drama critic of The New York Times examines the economics of the serious theatre.

Brooks Atkinson

"If the Broadway theatre were an industry, it would have to be described as a sick industry. . . . For every hit there are four failures—catastrophic failures that run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. . . .

"The cruelest fact is that there is no middle ground between the hit and the failure. Among the failures in the 1959-60 season there were several productions of merit in which many theatregoers believed. 'The Andersonville Trial,' 'Duel of Angels,' 'The Fighting Cock,' 'Greenwillow,' 'A Lovely Light,' 'Heartbreak House,' 'The Gang's All Here,' 'The Great God Brown,' 'Henry IV,' Parts 1 and 2 and 'The Deadly Game' would have survived in a rational theatre. In one degree or another they represented an intelligent approach to the theatre and were well performed, and they stimulated the imagination of many theatregoers.

"But a *succes d'estime* is likely to cost a producer and his backers \$100,000 and does not encourage them to cultivate a discriminating audience again. Costs of production and weekly operation differ radically according to the size of a production. But it would not be wide of the mark to assert that if the producer of a drama cannot attract a weekly audience of 10,000 or 12,000 persons for six months, he becomes an unwilling philanthropist.

Government
subsidy

"At this point many theatre people start thinking wistfully of Government subsidy. There are many plausible arguments for it—the importance of national culture and, specifically, the humiliating position the United States invariably occupies in international theatre festivals. . . .

"It seems [to me], however, that looking to our Government for support of the arts is like looking for dependence and control. It is not only the right but also the duty of Congress to supervise the expenditure of tax money; and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Congress has confidence in artists who have opinions. . . .

"Let's not forget that one branch of the Government refused to give Arthur Miller a passport to attend a production of his 'The Crucible' in Belgium in 1954, and that another branch regarded 'The Diary of Anne Frank' as politically unsuitable to represent the United States at the Paris Festival in 1956. Government is by nature the enemy of freedom of thought when it impinges on political or moral issues. . . .

Private
subsidy

"Private subsidy, [however], as opposed to Government subsidy, is, when it is given, a guarantee of freedom. . . . Probably we have to accept the unwelcome fact that a theatre of serious purpose . . . cannot be self-supporting. It has to be subsidized by foundations and patrons who believe that it enriches the cultural life of the community. . . . We must not overlook the fact that it is also subsidized by actors and staff people who are less well paid than they might be in the commercial theatre, and are willing to accept modest salaries in order to work at something they believe in passionately.

"There are no easy solutions to the economic problems of the commercial theatre. The current agreements between Actors' Equity and the League of New York Theatres surmount another crisis, but change nothing fundamental in the loose organization of the business. We have learned from history that the theatre will survive. But we cannot be sure that it will be the free, intelligent, vital theatre that we all dream about." (*The New York Times*, June 19, 1960)

FOR PRESIDENT: AN EXPERT

Each month Current publishes a lengthy reprint or condensation of material that seems to the editors of outstanding interest.

The verbatim extracts below are from Richard E. Neustadt's book, Presidential Power—The Politics of Leadership. Dr. Neustadt was on the White House staff during most of President Truman's second term. He is associate professor of government at Columbia University.

Richard E. Neustadt

The use
of power

When we inaugurate a President of the United States we give a man the powers of our highest public office. From the moment he is sworn the man confronts . . . the classic problem of the man on top in any political system: how to be on top in fact as well as name. . . .

To analyze the problem of obtaining personal power one must try to view the Presidency from over the President's shoulder, looking out and down with the perspective of *his* place. This is not the way that we conventionally view the office; ordinarily we stand outside it, looking in. From outside, or from below, a President is "many men," or one man wearing many "hats," or playing many "roles" . . . "Chief Legislator," "Chief Administrator," "Chief of Party," and the like. . . . [But] the President himself plays every "role," wears every "hat" at once. Whatever he may do in one role is by definition done in all, and has effects in all. When he attempts to make his wishes manifest, his own will felt, he is one man, not many. . . . His strength or weakness, then, turns on his personal capacity to influence the conduct of the men who make up government. His influence becomes the mark of leadership. To rate a President according to these rules, one looks into the man's own capabilities as seeker and as wielder of effective influence upon the other men involved in governing the country. . . .

No doubt there can be quite as much uncertainty, as much misjudgment, in the expert use of power as in expertise of any other sort. A sensitivity to power's stakes and sources is no cure-all. Over-sensitivity to any one aspect at any time might wreck the very things a President most wanted and leave him beneath the ruins. . . .

The sources of a President's own influence are various; his stakes in any act of choice are multiple and changeable. Appearances can be no less deceptive in the personal sphere than in spheres of diplomacy, or military tactics, or economics, or party politics, or any other. At given times a President is liable to misread the face of power no less than of policy. At some times he may be unable to affect his situation even though he reads them both aright. My point is not that he can guarantee against those fates, but merely that his chance to ward them off improves as he impresses on his choices expertise from *every* sphere of relevance, his own sphere with the rest: the sphere of personal power. . . .

To make the most of power for himself a President must know what it is made of. . . . If he wants it for the future, he must guard it in the present. He mounts guard, as best *he* can, when he appraises the effects of present action on the sources of his influence. In making that appraisal

**No place for
amateurs**

he has no one to depend on but himself; his power and its sources are a sphere of expertise reserved to him. But the issues that present themselves for action day by day rarely show his personal risks upon their surface. His expertise must first help him to see beneath the surface if it is to help him weigh what may be there. The President as expert does himself a double service. Without the expertise he cannot do it.

The Presidency, to repeat, is not a place for amateurs. That sort of expertise can hardly be acquired without deep experience in political office. The Presidency is a place for men of politics. But by no means is it a place for every politician.

There is no reason to suppose that politicians, on the average, have the wherewithal to help themselves build *presidential* power. The men of politics who specialize in organization work and party office scarcely qualify at all; governmental office is the relevant experience. For present purposes we can regard as politicians only those who build careers in public office. Yet expertise in presidential power does not follow automatically from such experience. No post in government at any level necessarily equips a man to recognize the Presidency's peculiar sources of influence. Those sources have as many parts as a President has constituencies, foreign and domestic; the posts that furnish insights into one part often obscure others.

**The need
for confidence**

Besides, past officeholding is no guarantee that any man brings with him to the White House the degree and kind of feeling for direction that can help him once he gets there. Former Commerce Secretary Hoover had a sense of purpose so precise as to be stultifying. Former Senator Harding seems to have had none at all. And mere experience, however relevant, is no assurance that a President will find the confidence he needs just when he needs it most. Such confidence requires that his image of himself in office justify an unremitting search for personal power. But it requires, also, that his image of himself allow for failures and frustration in the search. F.D.R. is said to have remarked that Lincoln "was a sad man because he couldn't get it all at once. And nobody can." If a President is to assist himself through the vicissitudes of four long years or eight, his source of confidence must make him capable of bearing Lincoln's sadness with good grace. The power-seeker whose self-confidence requires quick returns and sure success might make a mess of everything including his own power. Grace calls for humor and perspective. Political experience does not assure those qualities. Indeed, it may diminish them in the degree it brings a taste for power. The officeholder who combines them with an insight into presidential influence and hunger for it is no average politician.

Expertise in presidential power seems to be the province not of politicians as a class but of extraordinary politicians. What sets such men apart? Mr. Justice Holmes once characterized Franklin Roosevelt as a "second-rate intellect but a first-rate temperament." Perhaps this is a necessary combination. The politics of well-established government has rarely been attractive to and rarely has dealt kindly with the men whom intellectuals regard as first-rate intellects. Temperament, at any rate, is the great separator. Experience will leave its mark on expertise; so will a man's ambitions for himself and his constituents. But something like that "first-rate" temperament is what turns know-how and desire to his

Not pride
alone

personal account. The necessary confidence is nourished by that temperament. It is a human resource not discovered every day among American politicians.

If expertness in maximizing power for himself served purposes no larger than the man's own pride or pleasure, there would be no reason for the rest of us to care whether he were powerful or not. More precisely, there would be no reason except sentiment and partisanship. But a President's success in that endeavor serves objectives far beyond his own and far beyond his party's. For reasons I will come to in a moment, an expert search for presidential influence contributes to the energy of government and to the viability of public policy. Government is energized by a productive tension among its working parts. Policy is kept alive by a sustained transformation of intent into result. Energetic government and viable public policy are at a premium as we begin the seventh decade of the twentieth century. Expertise in presidential power adds to both. A President's constituents, regardless of their party (or their country for that matter), have a great stake in his search for personal influence.

Five
constituencies

In the American political system the President sits in a unique seat and works within a unique frame of reference. The things he personally has to do are no respecters of the lines between "civil" and "military," or "foreign" and "domestic," or "legislative" and "executive," or "administrative" and "political." At his desk—and there alone—distinctions of these sorts lose their last shred of meaning. The expectations centered in his person converge upon no other individual, nobody else feels pressure from all five of *his* constituencies. [Executive officialdom, Congress, his partisans, citizens at large, abroad]; no one else takes pressure in the consciousness that *he* has been elected "by the Nation." Besides, nobody but the President lives day by day with *his* responsibility in an atomic age amidst cold war. And he alone can claim unquestionable right to everybody's information on the mysteries of that age and that war. His place and frame of reference are unique. By the same token, though, his power is mercurial. Since no one shares his place, nobody is committed to uphold what he may do there. . . .

The things a President must think about if he would build his influence are not unlike those bearing on the viability of public policy. The correspondence may be inexact, but it is close. The man who thinks about the one can hardly help contributing to the other. A President who senses what his influence is made of and who means to guard his future will approach his present actions with an eye to the reactions of constituents in Washington and out. The very breadth and sweep of his constituencies and of their calls upon him, along with the uncertainty of their response, will make him keen to see and weigh what Arthur Schlesinger has called "the balance of administrative power." This is a balance of political, managerial, psychological, and personal feasibilities. And because the President's own frame of reference is at once so all-encompassing and so political, what he sees as a balance for himself is likely to be close to what is viable in terms of public policy.

With the grain
of history

Viability requires three ingredients. First is a purpose that moves with the grain of history, a direction consonant with coming needs. Second is an operation that proves manageable to the men who must administer it, acceptable to those who must support it, tolerable to those who must put up with it, in Washington and out. Timing can be crucial for support and acquiescence; proper timing is the third ingredient. The President

**What is good
for the
President . . .**

who sees his power stakes sees something very much like the ingredients that make for viability in policy.

Presidential expertise thus serves effective policy. Deciding what is viable has grown more critical and more complex with almost every turn of world events (and of home politics) since the Second World War. Substantive considerations have become so specialized that experts in one sphere lose touch with expertise in any other. Substantive appraisals have become so tricky that the specialists in every sphere dispute among themselves. In consequence the viability of policy may be the only ground on which a substantive decision can be reached. When that ground is itself inordinately complicated by the tendency of policies to interlock, and overlap, and to leap national boundaries, it becomes a sphere of expertise as specialized as others. In the sphere of viability our system can supply no better expert than a President intent on husbanding his influence—provided that he understands what influence is made of. . . .

The contributions that a President can make to government are indispensable. Assuming that he knows what power is and wants it, those contributions cannot help but be forthcoming in some measure as by-products of his search for personal influence. In a relative but real sense one can say of a President what Eisenhower's first Secretary of Defense once said of General Motors: what is good for the country is good for the President, and *vice versa*. There is no guarantee, of course, that every President will keep an eye on what is "good" for him; his sense of power and of purpose and the source of his self-confidence may turn his head away. If so, his "contributions" could be lethargy not energy, or policy that moves against, not with, the grain of history. The way he sees his influence and seeks it will affect the rest of us, no matter what becomes of him. . . .

The issues of the Sixties will be fought out in a system that keeps Presidents uniquely placed and gives them no assurance of sustained support. "Emergencies in policy with politics as usual" was my introductory characterization of the fifteen years just passed. Everything suggests that these mid-century conditions will persist into the new decade. But policy is likely to grow still more difficult, and politics is likely to grow hotter. Conditions will not be just what they were, they may be more so. It follows that our need will be the greater for a presidential expert in the Presidency. . . .

**Toward action
through
controversy**

We are confronted by an evident necessity for government more energetic, policies more viable, than we have been enjoying in the Fifties. . . . But every path to action leads through controversy. Effective policy can only be created out of the material our politics provides. It is not very promising material. If policy is to be viable, ways must be found in every field to reconcile all sorts of things now called irreconcilable. This is the special province of the President-as-expert whose concern for power brings him face to face with the ingredients that make for viability in policy.

A President who knows what power is and wants it has to face irreconcilables whenever he considers his own stakes in acts of choice. The sources of his influence are such that one may suffer from whatever serves another. The move that gains him ground on some particular may scar his general Washington reputation. The move that brightens Washington impressions may raise public hopes the future cannot meet.

Other hands,
other levers

And moves that seem imperative for reasons of high policy may threaten all three sources of his power. The essence of his expertise is an awareness that these are irreconcilable and that they must be reconciled. Viability in policy calls for the same awareness.

A President-as-expert is no cure-all. . . . Power cannot be his sole criterion for choice, nor will his choices be the only regulators of his influence. They are the only levers in *his* hands, but other hands hold other levers. And his influence, at most, is only one of many factors shaping what eventuates as governmental action; events and men beyond his personal control are much the greater shapers. One cannot look around the world in the late Fifties with any special confidence in men or in events throughout the Sixties. It is not easy, after such a look, to quarrel with those who think that science and technology have pushed our social competence too far. Yet it seems premature to write off the adaptability and the inventiveness of American public policy. Admitting that the future is not wholly in our hands, our policy responses may make a substantial difference. Despairing views could have been voiced—and were—in 1950, or in 1940, or in 1930. At a time and in a world where rates of change accelerate, the Sixties may be the decade that finally proves too much for us. But on the record of the past, the policy responses of our political system give us grounds for hope. (In the whole perspective of this century so far, our recent pause seems relatively brief; besides, it was a pause, not a regression.) We might as well enjoy the hope; there is no present prospect that we soon shall change the system. Nor is there any prospect that a change of system would eliminate our policy dilemmas.

The dangers of
personalized
power

An expert in the White House does not guarantee effective policy, but lacking such an expert every hope is placed in doubt. If past experience is reassuring, its assurances are conveyed with that caveat. The responses of our system remain markedly dependent on the person of the President. "As matters have stood," Edward Corwin writes, ". . . presidential power has been at times dangerously *personalized*," and with unerring instinct for an expertise in influence he distrusts Franklin Roosevelt only less than Abraham Lincoln. But if one wants effective policy from the American system, danger does not lie in our dependence on a man; it lies in our capacity to make ourselves depend upon a man who is inexpert. Any human judgment is worth fearing nowadays, but save for this the expert is a boon. His expertise assures a contribution to the system and it naturally commits him to proceed within the system. The system, after all, is what he knows. The danger lies in men who do not know it.

A dangerous dependence on the expertise of the top man—dependence on his "feel" for power in the going system—is not confined to the United States. It seems to be a feature of all democratic governments (presumably of Communist regimes as well) though sometimes, as in Britain, it is so disguised that numbers of Americans may not have noticed it. The British cabinet system tends to cover up the weaknesses and to show up the strengths of the top man; ours tends to do the opposite. English politics does not place amateurs on top, while ours has put an amateur in office very recently. But Britain, in this century, has not lacked for inexpert heads of government, albeit quite professional, and British policy has paid a heavy price for them; most recently in Eden's case, to say nothing of Chamberlain's. With the English, as with us,

**Leaders
"above politics"**

structure and conventions and traditions count for everything *within* the system since the top man's expertise is wedded to them. But the English seem to be no less dependent than Americans upon the contributions of an expert at the top. If we were to import the British system overnight, power at the White House would be personalized still—and the person might turn out to be a Ramsay MacDonald. Some dangers in political society are not escaped by structure.

One of those dangers is the yearning in our national electorate for political leaders "above politics." Eisenhower, to be sure, is *sui generis*. But part of Stevenson's appeal was that he had not been in politics for long and did not seem to be a "politician." . . . Desire for an amateur is not new in American politics; Wendell Willkie's instance makes that plain. Now we have had Eisenhower. Significantly, to the limited extent that Eisenhower has been criticized in public his detractors, for the most part, deal in arguments *ad hominem*. Much of the criticism is unjust. Little of it makes allowance for the words attributed to Speaker Rayburn in the spring of 1952: "No, won't do. Good man. Wrong profession." But this is the heart of the matter.

**Both great
and friend**

The striking thing about our national elections in the Fifties was not Eisenhower's personal popularity; it was the genuine approval of his candidacy by informed Americans who one might have supposed would know better. A sizeable majority of voters twice elected him. And save for one brief interval, his conduct as a President has always had commensurate approval on the showing of the Gallup Poll. Why not? The popular hero in a genuine sense, the man who is both great and friend, has never been in long supply with us. In the later Forties and throughout the Fifties, Eisenhower was the only one we had. To place him in the White House without losing him as a hero seems both reasonable and prudent on the part of average citizens, no matter what their general view of politics or Presidents. The same thing can be said of the Republican professionals who managed Eisenhower's nomination in 1952; their action appears reasonable and prudent in *their* terms. They twice had tried a leading politician as their candidate; this time they wanted most of all to win.

But when it comes to journalists, and government officials, and business leaders, and professors, who joined in the parade or urged it on, one deals with a phenomenon decidedly less reasonable. Some of Eisenhower's sharpest critics at the present time were once among his most articulate admirers. What was their understanding then—what is it now—of our political institutions? His virtue was supposed to be that he was above politics, and disenchantment with him rarely seems a disenchantment with this odd criterion. Instead it is all Eisenhower's fault that he is not what temperament and training never equipped him to be. When one finds attitudes of this sort in the circle of articulate observers, one wonders at the meaning of American society.

Before he reached the White House Woodrow Wilson once remarked: "Men of ordinary physique and discretion cannot be Presidents and live, if the strain be not somehow relieved. We shall be obliged always to be picking our chief magistrates from among wise and prudent athletes—a small class." . . . The strain is vastly greater now, with no relief in sight. If we want Presidents alive and fully useful, we shall have to pick them from among experienced politicians of extraordinary temperament—an even smaller class.

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CURRENT
JULY 1960

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